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Abstract
This thesis proposes techniques to mitigate multiple bit errors in GF arith-
metic circuits. As GF arithmetic circuits such as multipliers constitute the
complex and important functional unit of a crypto-processor, making them
fault tolerant will improve the reliability of circuits that are employed in
safety applications and the errors may cause catastrophe if not mitigated.
Firstly, a thorough literature review has been carried out. The merits of ef-
 cient schemes are carefully analyzed to study the space for improvement
in error correction, area and power consumption.
Proposed error correction schemes include bit parallel ones using opti-
mized BCH codes that are useful in applications where power and area are
not prime concerns. The scheme is also extended to dynamically correct-
ing scheme to reduce decoder delay. Other method that suits low power
and area applications such as RFIDs and smart cards using cross parity
codes is also proposed. The experimental evaluation shows that the pro-
posed techniques can mitigate single and multiple bit errors with wider
error coverage compared to existing methods with lesser area and power
consumption. The proposed scheme is used to mask the errors appearing
at the output of the circuit irrespective of their cause.
This thesis also investigates the error mitigation schemes in emerging tech-
nologies (QCA, CNTFET)to compare area, power and delay with existing
CMOS equivalent. Though the proposed novel multiple error correcting
techniques can not ensure 100% error mitigation, inclusion of these tech-
niques to actual design can improve the reliability of the circuits or in-
crease the dif culty in hacking crypto-devices. Proposed schemes can also
be extended to non GF digital circuits.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Cryptographic chips have gained signi!cant popularity owing to the growing demand
for security in day-to-day applications such as TV set-top boxes, bank ATMmachines,
mobile communications, and digital right management, where dedicated cryptographic-
processors play key role [1; 2]. Most of these processors execute popular encryption
and decryption algorithms with much higher ef!ciency and throughput as compared to
the software exclusive cryptography on generic processors. This is due to the fact that,
the stand alone cryptographic hardware proved to be faster and less power consum-
ing compared to when these cryptography algorithms are implemented over generic
processors.
Nowadays, dedicated cryptographic co-processors are commonly used to delicately
perform authentication operations in secure data processing applications. However, it
has recently been shown that such stand alone cryptography hardware can be hacked
deliberately by controlled radiation or light probing with high energy radiation parti-
cles in order to gain access to the sensitive information stored internally. These kinds
of attacks based on radiation bombardment are widely known as transient attacks [3].
The radiation interferences in digital circuit operations were initially considered to be
due to the decay of the packaging, however, as technology is evolving, this is also be-
coming an instrument for intruding into the inner details of the hardware. This is in
addition to other fault causes, e.g. manufacturing defects, etc., for hardware to become
faulty and thus providing erroneous results while operating. Thus it is vital to ensure
1
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that such delicate devices continue to perform fault-free even when they are subjected
to attacks or other kinds of manufacturing faults [4].
Due to the random nature of these radiation induced attacks, it is quite hard to
model and mitigate such malicious eavesdropping. The crypto-processors often con-
tain highly sensitive information such as the secret key and other con!dential data. For
example a bank ATM smart card contains information of the cardholder which is meant
to be secret to the third party [5]. An attacker, with the malicious intent of disrupting
civil and government infrastructures, can attempt to break into the crypto-processors
core for receiving the sensitive information by subjecting it to radiations under a con-
trolled environment in a complex laboratory set up. Such radiation induced attacks can
also reveal the internal architectures of a chip in a potential Intellectual Property (IP)
theft [6]. Such attacks mainly need the actual crypto-chip to be exposed hence they
are categorized as invasive type of attacks. Also the invasive attacks involve exposing
the chip using an electron microscope to learn the physical layout of the chip, which in
turn can help the hacker to carry out reverse engineering to predict the actual circuitry
that perform the operation, resulting in IP theft [7; 8].
Other categories of attacks are known as non-invasive attacks. This is due to the
fact that, the secret information within the chip is hacked without physically exposing
or damaging the chip [9]. These types of attacks are also known as side channel based
attacks. The side channels of a chip can manifest in various forms, e.g. through the
test scan chains, power signatures corresponding to critical on chip operations, acoustic
signatures, timing information, etc. Each of these critical signatures can provide vital
information to the hacker which can be used to reveal the secret information. For
example, the scan chains are mainly accommodated in a chip in order to test the chip
for any permanent faults such as manufacturing defects. Testing of an Integrated circuit
(IC) is done by feeding a known set of test patterns through the scan chains in test
mode and observing the response of these test vectors at the output for any error. This
highly effective feature of testability can be misused by making the circuit or device
malfunction with certain predetermined test cases and learn the secret information from
the response of the circuit to the test vectors.
Another active eavesdropping that can happen due to additional circuits added to
the actual layout during manufacturing stage. Due the globalization of semiconductor
industries where the chips are manufactured in a third party semiconductor foundry. In
2
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Figure 1.1: Various sources of information infringement in GF arithmetic circuits
such cases, the addition of intruder circuits also known as hardware trojans that make
the circuit temporarily faulty (under hacking mode) to help the attacker to gather the
hidden data or a security key that is been protected in the cryptographic chip. Such
trojan circuits may inject faults in active mode or they leak information through a
wireless channel.
The fault mitigation schemes presented in this thesis encompass both deliberate as
well as unintentional or natural causes that introduce bit  ips in actual functional block.
The unintentional or natural causes of faults include manufacturing defects mainly
due to the defects/imperfections in the manufacturing process such as due to trapped
dust particles on the die creating unwanted open or short circuits, defects that occur
in integrated circuits due to aging, electron migration, the harsh working environment
where these circuits are deployed for example when the integrated circuits are deployed
in space related applications where they are continuously in contact with cosmic rays,
etc. Some of the major sources of faults, errors and attacks on a GF (Galois Field)
arithmetic circuit appears in Figure 1.1.
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Owing to the these facts, it is necessary to ensure that secure devices continue to
perform fault free under all circumstances by keeping all the hidden information secret.
To alleviate transient attacks on cryptography hardware, this thesis proposes fault tol-
erant architectures as a way forward. The idea is to mask the effects of the faults/errors
for continued uninterrupted operations even in the presence of the errors/attacks that
produces incorrect logic output.
1.2 Aim of the Thesis
There are many cryptography algorithms that are used to encrypt and decrypt the infor-
mation that needs to be secured. The most widely used one is private key cryptography
(PKC). This is because, the users following PKC has to maintain only one private
key and the information can be send to a user using his public key, which is publicly
available. Again in various PKC schemes, Elliptic Curve PKC (ECPKC) is the recent
research area because of its enhanced security for smaller key sizes compared to other
popular cryptography algorithms [10; 11]. Cryptography hardware in general and a
crypto-processor in speci!c contain various arithmetic logic units based on Finite Field
or Galois Field (FF or GF) algebra. The ease of implementation and their carry free
logic made GF VLSI circuits more popular and widely used in security applications.
The cryptographic hardware relies heavily on one or more highly complex multiplier
circuits in order to perform various cryptographic algorithms. As such, the multiplier
circuits are often the most complex units in a crypto-processor and tend to occupy the
largest chip area [2]. Hence they are undoubtedly a key target of an attacker as well as
crucial when possessing permanent faults. Also a permanent fault on these processing
elements can be proved costly in terms of erroneous operations. Hence care should be
taken to make this critical block fault tolerant. As a result, this thesis is focused on
GF multiplier test bench circuits that are designed over binary Galois Fields. This is
due to the fact that the application speci!c VLSI circuits for cryptography applications
are mostly de!ned over Galois Fields. It is observed that very complex cryptography
arithmetic circuits (for example a NIST/FIPS standards suggest 163-bit multiplier for
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) arithmetics) often possess very high fan-out, mak-
ing the faults or injected errors at a critical node propagate to multiple outputs thus
resulting in multiple bit errors at the output. Considering the applicability and the need
4
1.3 Organization of the Thesis
for fault tolerant architectures in such critical applications, this thesis aims to con-
tribute various novel fault tolerant designs and architectures to prevent the integrated
circuits from being succumbed to erroneous operations in presence of manufacturing
faults (e.g. manufacturing defects, etc.), transient errors/faults (e.g. due to cosmic rays,
etc.), and malicious attacks based transient errors. This thesis consider and proposes
ef!cient multiple error correction as a method of fault tolerance. Even though there
exists many reported published works on error detection and correction, it is observed
from the critical review that there are very few multiple error correcting architectures
to alleviate the issue of multiple bit errors [12].
Potential Requirements of Fault Tolerant Circuits Modern day computing hard-
ware requires much more processing power to perform complex computations ef!-
ciently and quickly than ever before. The rapid advances in integration technology,
driven by Moores law, made it possible to meet such high integration density in VLSI
circuits, which can be as high as a trillion or more transistors in a single die. However,
such a rapid miniaturization of devices resulted in scaling down other device parame-
ters such as power supply (VDD), threshold voltage (Vth), etc., along with it. Scaling
in theVDD andVth can make these tiny devices susceptible to transient induced faults.
Such adverse problems also affect the devices that are deployed in security related
application such as PKC [11; 12].
As one know, a permanent manufacturing fault will produce erroneous results on
all the times. In addition to this, the transient faults injected to these minute devices
may give an intelligent attacker the information that he is looking for. This will include
a secret key information, the type of algorithm that the device executing, the hardware
structure etc. Owing to these facts, there were many approaches proposed to make such
critical ASICs tolerant towards various faults that affect the yield and performance of
the systems. This clearly shows the potential interest of fault tolerant architectures and
their vital application in designing reliable and fault tolerant circuits.
1.3 Organization of the Thesis
Ever growing demand for secure computing and rapid advancement in technology node
succeeded in providing security and privacy in modern day computing. However, vari-
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ous factors like hardware implementation weaknesses, unavoidable naturally occurring
faults creates a loophole for a potential attacker with malicious intention to sneak in.
Though there are several ways of gathering secret information from hardware, this the-
sis mainly focuses on faults or attacks predominantly affecting the logic functionality
of the circuit by creating bit  ips in the circuit to produce erroneous output. Basic
outline of the rest of the thesis is outlined as follows,
Chapter 1 gives motivation and the requirement for fault tolerant circuit technique
and their critical applications in cryptography hardware. The rest of the thesis is orga-
nized as follows.
In Chapter 2, the fundamentals of algebraic arithmetic operations and background
of Faults, Errors and transient attacks over GF arithmetic circuits are presented. This
includes the theory of Groups, Rings and Fields and arithmetic operations over them.
The fundamental arithmetic operations such as addition and multiplication over binary
Galois Fields are also discussed for completeness of the remaining chapters in this
thesis. However, this thesis focuses on the arithmetic circuits that are de!ned over
binary extension !elds only. The underlying theory presented in this thesis can be
extended over non binary !elds and their extensions. For completeness, various faults,
their occurrences and various possible attacks on the GF arithmetic circuits are also
explained brie y for completeness in this chapter. However, this thesis mainly focuses
on fault tolerant schemes for mitigating errors or faults resulting in single or multiple
bit errors at the output.
Chapter 3 summarizes the state of the art fault tolerant architectures that are avail-
able in literature. In this chapter various error detection and correction schemes that
are closely related to this thesis are critical reviewed and reported. The main focus of
this chapter is on error detection schemes such as concurrent Error Detection (CED)
and other fault tolerant architectures mainly over the Galois Fields and other digital
circuits. The GF arithmetic architectures explained in this chapter includes bit-parallel
and digit serial arithmetic circuits de!ned over various basis of binary !elds. For
completeness, some of the fault tolerant techniques for memory designs are also re-
viewed in this chapter. Finally, the baseline research which was carried out based
on the Reed-Solomon codes, initiated the research towards other novel multiple error
correcting techniques are brie y explained in this chapter. A part of this thesis ap-
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peared in the Proceedings of the IEEE Int. Symposium on Electronic System Design
(ISED2010),Bhubaneswar, India [13].
A novel multiple error correction architecture based on t-error correcting BCH
codes is proposed in Chapter 4. This architecture is developed to detect and correct
multiple bit errors at the output in high speed applications where area overhead is
not the prime concern. The !rst part of this chapter presents the fundamental the-
ory of classical BCH code with a design example. A closed form equation for par-
ity generation and syndrome computation is derived. The second part of this chapter
presents the extended version of the multiple error correction scheme to a dynamically
error correctable architecture in order to reduce the unwanted delay from the correc-
tion block of the architecture in the absence of an error. Finally, the last part of this
chapter reports the experimental analysis and results of the proposed architecture over
GF multiplier test bench circuits of various complexities. Partial results presented in
this chapter have appeared in peer reviewed journal article and conferences: Interna-
tional Journal of Electronics (Open Access MDPI), ISSN 2079-929 [14], In Proceed-
ings of the IEEE/ACM Int. Symposium Quality Electronic Design (ISQED2011),
Santa Clara, USA, March 2011 [10] and In Proceedings of the 20th European Confer-
ence on Circuit Theory and Design, ECCTD2011, Linkoepoing, Sweden, August 2011
[15]. The design techniques presented in this chapter are also patent pending (Patent
No. 1114831.9. Filed on 26 August, 2011).
In Chapter 5, a novel low complexity cross parity code, highly suitable for hardware
implementations, is proposed for multiple error correction. As opposed to the design
architecture proposed in Chapter 4, the Cross parity based techniques are well suited
for low power and area constrained applications. The motivation of this technique is
to correct as many multiple error patterns, containing single and multiple errors, as
possible, while keeping the area and power overhead as low as possible. This chapter
also explains the design techniques in details with a design example. The performance
evaluation to predict the fault coverage is done with fault analysis and mathematical
bounds on the minimum and maximum number of error patterns this technique can
detect/correct are also presented. Results presented in this thesis have appeared in
Proceedings of the IEEE Int. Symposium Quality Electronic Design (ISQED2012),
Santa Clara, USA, March 2012 [16] also submitted to the journal IEEE Trans. on
Very Large Scale Integrated Systems (under review) in June 2012. The architecture is
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also patent pending in application M. Poolakkaparambil, A. Jabir, J. Mathew, and D.
Pradhan. Cross parity based error tolerant electronic circuit design. In US Patent No.
61/608,694. Filed on 9 March, 2012.
The possible CMOS replacement technologies and effect of faults over the Emerg-
ing technologies are evaluated in Chapter 6. Due to further reduction in feature size,
such emerging technologies are more vulnerable to manufacturing faults and attacks
that create bit  ips. For feasibility check of conventional fault tolerant techniques over
these fairly new technologies, this chapter investigates the Hamming code based con-
current error detection scheme over Carbon Nano Tube Field Effect Transistors (CNT-
FET) and Quantum Cellular Automata (QCA) based emerging technologies. The area,
power, and delay overheads of these emerging technologies in comparison with CMOS
circuits are analyzed in this chapter. Results presented in this chapter are appeared in
the peer reviewed conferences, M. Poolakkaparambil, J. Mathew, and A. Jabir. Fault
Resilient Galois Field Multiplier Design in Emerging Technologies. In Proc. Int. Conf.
on Eco-friendly Comp. and Comm. Systems, ICECCS2012 (Springer Lecture Notes
in Computer Science (LNCS)), India, August 2012 [17] and M. Poolakkaparambil,
J. Mathew, A. Jabir, and S. Mohanty. Concurrent Error Detection Over Binary Ga-
lois Fields in CNTFET and QCA technologies. In Proc. IEEE Int. Symp. on VLSI
(ISVLSI2012), Texas, USA, August 2012 [18].
Finally Chapter 7 discuss the conclusion of this thesis and provide insights to the
possible future extension of this research thesis. Even though both CMOS and other
emerging technologies such as QCA and CNTFETs are prone to faults, the sources of
fault may not be the same. For example, in QCA one of the possible fault sources can
be due to the displacement of the QCA cells creating unwanted inversion hence the bit
 ip in logic. Similarly in CNTFETs, the errors may vary due to the different physical
and chemical properties on carbon nano tube in comparison with the poly silicon gate
in CMOS. Hence, new methodologies at manufacturing level and circuit level may be
developed towards alleviating such imperfections and there by the resulting faults.
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Chapter 2
Finite Field Arithmetic Circuits and
Factors Affecting their Reliability
2.1 Introduction
Finite Fields or Galois Fields (GF) !nd applications mainly in error correcting codes
and cryptography. Generally the cryptographic algorithms are implemented in soft-
ware domain and they are executed using a general purpose processor. However, re-
quirements for low power, low area, and high speed computational units in applications
like RFID and smart cards gave rise to the need for application speci!c cryptography
embedded processors. Such processors mainly constitute arithmetic units designed
over GF for faster and ef!cient computation. In particular, public key cryptographic
algorithms such as the Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) constitutes several addition,
multiplication, and inversion stages over GF. Hence this chapter !rstly introduces !nite
!eld algebra, various operations over them, and their equivalent hardware implementa-
tions. The proofs for the standard theorems used in this thesis are from [19; 20; 21]. In
addition, various notions of faults and attacks over VLSI structures are also presented
in this chapter for better understanding of hardware based attacks and other common
sources of faults. The general attacks against crypto-hardware and other vlsi hardware
circuits are explained for completeness of the thesis. However, the contributions of
this thesis is focused on tolerance against faults and attacks that mainly manipulate the
logic function of the circuit.
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2.2 Groups, Rings, and Fields
Algebra in general can be considered as operations over a set of elements with unique
properties. Depending on the characteristics of these unique operations and the prop-
erties of these sets, the algebras are classi!ed into Groups, Rings, and Fields.
Groups
De nition 1 A set of elements G is said to be a group if a binary operation ∗ is de ned
over the set elements and they satisfy the following axioms,
1. Associativity: A ∗ (B ∗ C) = (A ∗ B)∗ C, ∀ A,B,C ∈ G.
2. Commutativity: A ∗ B = B ∗ A, ∀ A,B ∈ G.
3. Inverse: For any non zero element A ∈ G, there exists another element A−1,
called the inverse of A, such that A ∗ A−1 = A−1 ∗ A = 1.
4. Unity: There exists an identity element 1 such that, A ∗ 1 = 1 ∗ A = A, ∀ A ∈ G.
Rings
De nition 2 A set of elements R is said to be a ring if two binary operations +, ∗ are
de ned over them and they satisfy the following axioms,
1. Associativity: A ∗ (B ∗ C) = (A ∗ B)∗ C, ∀ A,B,C ∈ R.
2. Commutativity: A ∗ B = B ∗ A, ∀ A,B ∈ R.
3. Distributivity: A ∗ (B + C) = (A ∗ B) + (A ∗ C),
4. Multiplicative Identity: There exists and identity element 1 for ∗ operation such
that, A ∗ 1 = 1 ∗ A = A, ∀ A ∈ R.
5. Additive Identity: There exists an identity element 0 for + operation such that, A
+ 0 = 0 + A = A, ∀ A ∈ R.
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Fields
De nition 3 A set of elements F is said to be a Field if two binary operations +, ∗ are
de ned over them and they satisfy the following axioms,
1. Multiplicative Identity: There exists and identity element 1 for ∗ operation such
that, A ∗ 1 = 1 ∗ A = A, ∀ A ∈ F.
2. Additive Identity: There exists and identity element 0 for + operation such that,
A + 0 = 0 + A = A, ∀ A ∈ F.
3. If F forms a commutative ring.
4. Inverse: For any non zero element A ∈ F, there exists another element A−1,
called as the inverse of A, such that A ∗ A−1 = A−1 ∗ A = 1.
Properties of Fields The !elds have certain properties and distinct characteristics
that makes them unique. The number of elements in a !eld is known as the order
of the !eld. However, to ef!ciently de!ne the cryptographic algorithms and perform
their faster operations, the !elds must have a !nite set of elements, in which case
they are known as !nite !elds. The operations over the !nite !elds, e.g. addition,
multiplication, division, and inversion, are all closed, i.e. the results of the operations
are also contained in the !nite !elds. Hence, the set is called as a closed set over these
operations.
A set forms a !nite !eld F having order n, where n = pm, if and only if p is prime
number and is known as the characteristics of the !eld. If m = 1, then the !eld is
called the prime !eld. For anym> 1, the !eld is known as an extension !eld. It is noted
that for hardware implementation with binary encoding, the !elds used are with order
2m also known as the binary extension !elds and is denoted by GF(2m). This is simply
because all arithmetic over binary extension !elds can be realized using only the AND-
XOR logic. Also another advantage is that arithmetic operations overGF(2m) is carry-
free and would help to perform the cryptographic application faster and ef!ciently over
binary extension domain compared to prime domain. This characteristics of binary
!elds is very attractive when designing low power, low end application speci!c crypto-
processors. As this thesis focuses mainly on the binary extension !elds, the rest of this
thesis is constrained to operations over GF(2m).
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2.2.1 Polynomials over Fields
The classical way of representing !nite !elds over GF(2m) is using monic irreducible
polynomials of the form P(x) = xm−1+∑m−2i=0 pi.x
i, where pi ∈ GF(2). Other than the
elements 0 and 1, the !eld consists of elements that are multiples of the element α ,
also known as the primitive element, where α is the root of P(x), i.e. P(α) = 0. P(x)
is also known as the primitive polynomial of the !eld. Hence, the binary extension
!eld GF(2m) is generated as powers of the primitive element α . The resulting set of
elements of the !eld is {1,α,α2,α3, ...,αm−1}, which is also known as the Polyno-
mial Basis (PB) or the Standard Basis. To make sure that the operations over the !eld
are !nite, any element in the !eld having power >m−1 is reduced to an element with
power < m−1 by using the primitive polynomial P(x). Any element A ∈ GF(2m) can
be represented using the elements in PB. The elements A, B where, A,B ∈ GF(2m) is
represented in PB as, A(x) = ∑m−1i=0 aix
i, and B(x) = ∑m−1i=0 bix
i, , where ai, bi ∈ GF(2).
Example 1 Let us consider an example of GF(24). Let P(x)=x4+ x3+1 be the prim-
itive polynomial with α being the primitive root. The  eld GF(24) has 16 elements
including the additive and multiplicative identities. The generated elements of the  eld
in both polynomial form and bit vector form are given in Table 2.1.
It is noted that, any element having power greater than α3 is reduced to an element
with power less than or equal to 3 with the primitive polynomial. It is possible that
multiple primitive polynomial may exist for a  eld over GF(2m). The properties of the
 eld, especially the complexity of the hardware implementations of its basic operations,
very much depend upon the primitive polynomial that is chosen. For example for the
 eld GF(24), x4 + x+ 1 is another possible primitive polynomial for generating the
 eld. The primitive polynomial x4+x+1 generates completely different  eld elements.
Finite Field Arithmetic over Polynomial Basis Let GF(2) represents the base !eld
and GF(2m)represents the binary extension !eld [22]. Then, GF(2m)forms a !nite
!eld that contains exactly 2m−1 elements. Any pair of elements A, B ∈ GF(2m)can be
represented in polynomial form as,
A(x) =
m−1
∑
i=0
aix
i. (2.1)
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Table 2.1: GF(24) elements in PB with P(x) = x4+ x3+1.
GF(24) elements Polynomial Representation Bit Vector
0 0 0000
1 1 0001
α α 0010
α2 α2 0100
α3 α3 1000
α4 α3+1 1001
α5 α3+α +1 1011
α6 α3+α2+α +1 1111
α7 α2+α +1 0111
α8 α3+α2+α 1110
α9 α2+1 0101
α10 α3+α 1010
α11 α3+α2+1 1101
α12 α +1 0011
α13 α2+α 0110
α14 α3+α2 1100
13
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B(x) =
m−1
∑
i=0
bix
i. (2.2)
Addition over Polynomial Basis Addition over GF(2m) is a simple and straightfor-
ward operation. The addition of two elements A and B ∈ GF(2m) is just the XOR
operation of the individual bits of A and B respectively. This can be shown as,
A(x)+B(x) mod P(x) =
m−1
∑
i=0
(ai +bi)x
i. (2.3)
Multiplication over Polynomial Basis Unlike addition, multiplication over PB is
considered to be a complex operation in GF algebra [23]. The majority of the cryp-
tographic algorithms constitute several GF addition and multiplication stages. Due to
the complexity of GF multipliers, several multiplication algorithms and their equiva-
lent hardware implementations have been attempted by researchers across the globe
[24; 25; 26; 27].
The classical approach of GF multiplication of two elements A(x), B(x) ∈ GF(2m)
is represented as,
C(x) = A(x) ·B(x) mod P(x). (2.4)
where, P(x) is the primitive polynomial and C(x) is the multiplication result. This is
also known as the two-stepmultiplication. In step 1, both multiplicands A(x) and B(x)
having maximum powers m− 1 are multiplied producing an intermediate multiplica-
tion result I(x) having the maximum power of 2m− 2. In step 2, the intermediate
product I(x) is reduced with the primitive polynomial P(x) thus yielding the !nal re-
duced productC(x) having power m−1.
The classical PB multiplication could be better explained with the same !eld over
GF(24) considered in Example 1.
Example 2 Let A(x) and B(x) be the two multiplicands ∈ GF(24). Also let P(x) =
x4+ x3+1 be the primitive polynomial with α being the primitive root. Then,
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A(x) =
3
∑
i=0
aix
i (2.5)
= a0+a1x+a2x
2+a3x
3.
Similarly, B(x) can be represented as,
B(x) =
3
∑
i=0
bix
i (2.6)
= b0+b1x+b2x
2+b3x
3.
The intermediate product term I(x) is given by,
I(x) =
(
3
∑
i=0
aix
i
)(
3
∑
i=0
bix
i
)
= a0b0+(a0b1+a1b0)x+(a0b2+a1b1+a2b0)x
2+(a0b3+a1b2+a2b1+a3b0)x
3
+(a1b3+a2b2+a3b0)x
4+(a2b3+a3b2)x
5+a3b3x
6 (2.7)
To get the  nal reduced multiplication result from Equation 2.7, a modular reduc-
tion operation should be performed with the primitive polynomial P(x)=x4 + x3 + 1.
Hence, all the terms in Equation 2.7 having power greater than 3 will be reduced as
given in Equation 2.4 and Table 2.1. the  nal product will be,
C(x) = a0b0+(a0b1+a1b0)x+(a0b2+a1b1+a2b0)x
2
+ (a0b3+a1b2+a2b1+a3b0)x
3
+ (a1b3+a2b2+a3b0)(x
3+1)+(a2b3+a3b2)(x
3+ x+1)
+ a3b3(x
3+ x2+ x+1) (2.8)
= (a0b0+a1b3+a2b2+a3b0+a2b3+a3b2)
+ (a0b1+a1b0+a2b3+a3b2+a3b3)x
+ (a0b2+a1b1+a2b0+a3b3)x
2
+ (a0b3+a1b2+a2b1+a3b0+a1b3+a2b2
+ a3b0+a2b3+a3b2+a3b3)x
3 (2.9)
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Matrix Formulation of Polynomial Basis Multiplication It was Mastrovito [26]
who simpli ed the classical PB multiplication into a much simpler matrix form. In
the Mastrovito algorithm, the  nite  eld polynomial multiplication and the modular
reduction is combined into a single step, known as the Mastrovito product matrix. The
generic Mastrovito algorithm is given by,
[C] = [M] · [B] (2.10)
where, [C] is the PB multiplication output, [M] is the Mastrovito multiplication matrix,
and [B] is the multiplicand. The Mastrovito matrix is obtained from the multiplicand
matrix [A] and the irreducible primitive polynomial matrix [P] [28].
There are several extended Mastrovito algorithms proposed to further simplify the
matrix based multiplication. The most popular one is by Hasan. et. al [29] in which
a more generalized version of the Mastrovito algorithm has been proposed for bit par-
allel architectures characterized over special primitive polynomials such as trinomials,
Equally Spaced Polynomials (ESP) and certain classes of pentanomials. The general-
ized Mastrovito algorithm is given in the following,
Let A and B be the two multiplicands with A = [a0,a1,a2, . . . ,am−1] and B =
[b0,b1,b2, . . . ,bm−1]. The ais and bis, where 0 ≤ i ≤ m−1, are the coordinates of
A and B respectively. The formulation is based on three matrices namely, an m×m
reduction matrix Q, a m×m lower triangular matrix L and a (m−1)×m upper trian-
gular matrixU . The matrix based multiplication is formulated as an inner product (IP)
network with two vector outputs ~d and~e respectively, where,
~d = L~b (2.11)
~e = U~b, (2.12)
The L andU matrices can be represented as,
L =









a0 0 0 0 · · · 0
a1 a0 0 0 · · · 0
a2 a1 a0 0 · · · 0
...
. . .
. . .
...
am−2 am−3 · · · a1 a0 0
am−1 am−2 · · · a2 a1 a0









(2.13)
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U =







0 am−1 am−2 · · · a2 a1
0 0 am−1 · · · a3 a2
...
. . .
. . .
...
0 0 · · · 0 · · · am−1 am−2
0 0 · · · 0 · · · 0 am−1







(2.14)
Also,~b= [b0,b1,b2, . . . ,bm−1]
T , a column vector of the coordinates of multiplicand
B, where xT represents the x transpose. The matrices L and U.
The multiplication outputs are given by the equation
~c = ~d+QT~e, (2.15)
where the matrix Q, known as the reduction matrix, is dependent on the irreducible
polynomial. The vector~c = [c0,c1,c2, . . . ,cm−1]
T represents the multiplication result.
The remaining chapters in this thesis use the bit parallel multiplier structures as a
design examples in order to test the proposed fault tolerant architectures. Hence, the
bit parallel PB matrix multiplication scheme, based on the example in Section 2.2.1, is
explained below for completeness.
Example 3 Let us consider Equation 2.7. Let ∑m−1i=0 di represent the coef cient of the
 rst m−1 terms. Similarly, let ∑2m−1i=m ei represent the coef cient of the rest of the terms
having power from m to 2m−1 of the multiplication inner products before the modular
reduction. Hence, Equation 2.7 can be rewritten as,
I(x) = d0+d1x+d2x
2+d3x
3
+e0x
4+ e1x
5+ e2x
6 (2.16)
From the primitive polynomial P(x) = x4+x3+1, the terms having powers greater
than m− 1 can be calculated. Hence the term x4 = x3 + 1, x5 = x(x4) = x(x3 + 1)
= x4 + x = x3 + x+ 1, x6 = x(x5) = x(x3 + x+ 1) = x4 + x2 + x = x3 + 1+ x2 + x =
x3 + x2 + x+ 1. Substituting these higher order terms back into Equation 2.16 and
further simpli ed to obtain the equation C(x) = I(x) mod P(x),
C(x) = (d0+ e0+ e1+ e2)+(d1+ e1+ e2)x+(e2+d2)x
2
+(d3+ e0+ e1+ e2)x
3 (2.17)
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The Equation 2.17 can be represented in terms of a matrix multiplication of the
form given in Equation 2.15 as shown below,





c0
c1
c2
c3





=





1 1 1
0 1 1
0 0 1
1 1 1








e0
e1
e2



+





d0
d1
d2
d3





(2.18)
which is of the form given in the Equation 2.15.
The equivalent VLSI circuit and its more generic form are shown in Fig. 2.1.
2.2.2 Finite Fields over Normal Basis
Similar to the PB,  nite  elds can be constructed over other basis, for example, the
Normal Basis (NB). For every polynomial basis over GF(2m), there exist a NB for ev-
ery integer m. Any element β ∈ GF(2m)form a NB of the form {β ,β 2
1
,β 2
2
, ...,β 2
m−1
}
over GF(2m), where β is known as the NB element or the constructor element of the
NB similar to the element α for the PB. In fact, the element β is always a power of
the element α over the NB. One important fact is that all the elements in the NB are
linearly independent, i.e. the sum of all elements in the NB yields the value 1.
Any element A ∈ GF(2m) can be represented in the NB as,
A(x) =
m−1
∑
i=0
aiβ
2i . (2.19)
Properties of NB The  nite  elds de ned over the NB  nds critical applications
in cryptography due to several reasons. One of the main reason is that a squaring
operation in the NB is just a cyclic left shift operation. The shift operation in hardware
is very simple and hence considered to be of zero cost. On the other hand, squaring is
complex in the PB.
Let A ∈ GF(2m) represent an element of the NB, where A is given by,
A = a0β +a1β
21 +a2β
22 + ...+am−1β
2m−1 (2.20)
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Figure 2.1: GF(24) multiplier
then the square of A is given by,
A2 = am−1β +a0β
21 +a1β
22 + ...+am−2β
2m−1 (2.21)
Addition of elements in NB is just simple XOR operation between the individual
bits as in the case of PB.
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Multiplication over NB Although the squaring operation is comparatively simple in
NB, construction of the NB is not straight forward as in case of the PB. Although there
exists a NB for every PB over GF(2m),  nding the right root α for which the NB exist
is a dif cult task. This means that one has to  nd the right power of α for which all
the elements in NB are linearly independent.
Let A,B∈GF(2m) denote two elements in the NB. Then the multiplication product
C is given by,
C(x) =
m−1
∑
i=0
aiβ
2i
m−1
∑
j=0
b jβ
2 j mod P(x) (2.22)
Let us consider the design example of GF(24) that is considered in Example 2.
With primitive polynomial P(x) = x4 + x3 + 1 and α being its primitive root, the
elements {β ,β 2
1
,β 2
2
, ...,β 2
m−1
} form a NB with α = β . Hence, the NB elements
A,B ∈GF(24) can be represented as, A = a0β +a1β
2+a2β
22 +a3β
23 and B = b0β +
b1β
2+b2β
22 +b3β
23 . The multiplication productC is given by,
C(x) = (a0β +a1β
2+a2β
22 +a3β
23)(b0β +b1β
2+b2β
22 +b3β
23)
= (a2b3+a3b2)β
12+(a1b3+a3b1)β
10
+ (a2b2)β
8+(a2b1+a1b2)β
6
+ (a2b0+a0b2)β
5+(a1b1)β
4+(a0b1+a1b0)β
3
+ (a0b0)β
2+(a3b3)β (2.23)
The elements {β 3,β 5,β 6,β 9,β 10,β 12} can be found from the primitive polynomi-
als as, β 12 = (β 2+β 4+β 8), β 10 = (β 2+β 8), β 9 = (β +β 4+β 8), β 6 = (β +β 2+β 4),
β 5 = (β + β 4), β 3 = (β + β 2 + β 8). Substituting these values in Equation 2.23 gives
the four product bits ofC as given below,
C(x) = (a2b2+a3b2+a2b3+a3b1+a1b3+a3b0+a0b3+a1b0+a0b1)β
+ (a1b1+a2b1+a1b2+a2b0+a0b2+a2b3+a3b2+a0b3+a3b0)β
2
+ (a0b0+a1b0+a0b1+a1b3+a3b1+a1b0+a2b1+a3b2+a2b3)β
4
+ (a3b3+a0b3+a3b0+a0b2+a2b0+a0b3+a1b0+a2b2+a1b2)β
8
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Here, each product bit has a mutual relationship between them. The higher order
bits are just the cyclic shift operations of the lower order bits. This property was  rst
observed by Massey-Omura and hence this style of multiplication is known as Massey-
Omura multiplication [30]. Since then, several optimized multiplications over NB have
been proposed [31]. Similar to the PBmultiplication, a matrix multiplication algorithm
has been proposed in [28]. It is also noted that for certain powers of α ∈ GF(2), the
resulting NB is optimized. Such NB are known as the Gaussian NB [31].
Close observations of these multiplication structures show that, these are highly
vulnerable to faults that can result in multiple bit errors at the outputs. This is due
to their huge area compared to other functional blocks and internal node fan outs.
The following sections discuss the main sources of faults in VLSI circuits (including
crypto-hardware circuits those are the main targets of hardware attacks), some of which
can be misused for malicious attacks on systems.
2.3 Faults in Integrated Circuits
Faults are the fundamental cause leading to the failure of any system in general. In
case of an integrated circuit, including the GF ICs, faults often give rise to one or more
errors and the errors may or may not result in the temporal or permanent failure of the
device or system that the integrated circuit is a part of. The terms faults, errors, and
failures are often used in the context of fault-tolerant computing as these are dependent
on one another and decides the reliability of the the device under consideration. This
section hence throw limelight on the various faults and other factors affects the reli-
ability of GF ICs and the VLSI circuits in general [32]. The cryptographic hardware
rely heavily on one or more highly complex multiplier circuits. As such, the multiplier
circuits are often the most complex units in a crypto-processor and tend to occupy the
largest chip area [2]. Hence they are undoubtedly a key target of an attacker.
More elaborately the technical terms Fault, Error, Failure and the causes of these
are explained in the following parts of this chapter,
Fault The term fault refers to any imperfection caused by any hardware or software
component of a system due to a physical damage (defects) or similar factors. The fault
can either be permanent or temporary.
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Error Error is the aftermath of the fault in a system. An erroneous system produces
incorrect or infeasible results as compared to the expected results as a result of the
fault. The error can be either permanent error or temporary depending up on whether
the fault is permanent or temporary.
Failure A hardware failure happens when it provides incorrect output due to a tem-
porary or a permanent fault.
Depending upon the nature and occurrence of these fault in GF arithmetic circuits,
they are divided mainly into nonmalicious and malicious faults [2]. The properties of
these faults and their subdivisions are explained brie!y in the following sections of this
chapter.
2.3.1 Nonmalicious Faults
Nonmalicious faults are naturally occurring faults or faults which are not intentional
and that affects the reliability of the GF ICs and the digital VLSI circuits in general.
The effects of such faults on chip wafer have a predictable behavior which can be mod-
eled. The main causes of these are faults from manufacturing process variations of the
nano scale VLSI circuits (faults happening during various abstractions of fabrication
steps) as well as the noisy environment these devices are deployed in.
Manufacturing Faults Manufacturing faults are the ones that may cause permanent
faults in VLSI circuits during the fabrication. Todays manufacturing technology is far
more complex than it was a decade ago. The complicated manufacturing process con-
sists of many fabrication steps. Various chemicals are used during the fabrication steps
of the ICs and they need to be etched away or cleaned away completely. However, in
most cases many of the chemical particles (Alien particles) will remain on the silicon
surface causing foreign particle contamination with the metallic wires. Such contami-
nation may contribute unwanted open or short circuits between the nano metallic wires
connecting devices within the circuits. These can result in the, so called, stuck-at faults
or stuck-open faults. Both stuck-at and stuck-open faults are permanent in nature and
hence can cause the device to perform erroneously [33].
22
2.3 Faults in Integrated Circuits
(a) Open circuit fault: example 1.
(b) Open circuit fault: example 2.
Figure 2.2: Stuck open faults due to alien particle contamination [33].
It is also possible that the materials used in the IC manufacturing can change their
properties due to many reasons. For example, corrosion can cause the material to
corrode away and cause permanent stuck-open faults to appear on a particular metal
line. Also a weak deposition of metallic layer can result in electron migration when
high current passes through it for prolonged periods of time, causing stuck-open faults.
Though the process variation during manufacturing is uniform across the wafer,
faults concentrating on a particular spot on the wafer is dif cult to model on unpre-
dictable during manufacturing. Hence, these faults are also called as spot defects.
Fig. 2.2(a) and Fig. 2.2(b) refer to the stuck-open (open circuit) faults resulting
from deposition of foreign particles during the fabrication process. Similarly, Fig. 2.3(a)
and Fig. 2.3(b) refers to the closed circuit or stuck-at faults. Open circuit fault due to
the corrosion of metallic wire is shown in Fig. 2.4.
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(a) Short circuit fault: example 1.
(b) Short circuit fault: example 2.
Figure 2.3: Stuck at faults due to alien particle contamination [33].
Figure 2.4: Stuck open fault due to metallic corrosion [33]
Faults from Operating Environment The faults resulting from noisy operating en-
vironment are random and temporal in nature. These faults are also known as transient
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faults and the error caused by these faults are generally known as soft errors. Evolution
of complex, modern VLSI technology, and high integration density are the major cause
of the transient faults. As the integration density increases, the nano devices become
more susceptible towards the transient faults. The soft errors are the results of high
energy particle strikes on the integrated circuit when they are deployed in radiation
prone environments such as in space applications [3].
When high energy particles, such as alpha, gamma, and other cosmic rays, strike on
the silicon surfaces of an IC, it can produce an ionization current close to the depletion
region of the transistor causing the transient charge carriers to be collected at the gate
region. This phenomenon will produce unwanted glitches and hence can give rise to
soft (temporal) errors. The soft errors caused by such radiation induced current pulses
are often known as a Single Event Upset (SEU) or Multiple Event Upsets (MEU).
SEUs and MEUs are a major concern in memory circuits, integrated circuits deployed
in space, and other avionics applications, and in radio active plants [34].
Until the early 21st century, the issue of soft errors from radiation and collected
charged particles by the nano devices was considered to be more of a theoretical pos-
sibility than an actual practical issue. However, in 2000, SUN reported their ULTRA-
SPARC II work stations malfunctioning due to the radiation induced soft errors. Ini-
tially, the causes of the problem were unclear, but eventually it was discovered that the
root cause of the issue was from the IBM memory blocks in the workstations, which
were susceptible to radiation [35]. Hence, it is evident that the SEUs and MEUs are
serious issues that need addressing at the design stages of todays highly integrated
circuits to enhance their reliability.
2.3.2 Malicious Faults
Inspired by the nonmalicious faults, researchers have reverse engineered the effects of
transient faults in VLSI circuits and then applied this to test the amount of information
that can be decoded from the devices under faulty conditions. The research  eld fo-
cuses intruding and gaining information maliciously from dedicated GF VLSI circuits
are commonly known as crypt analysis. Cryptanalysis generally uses various device
channels and other intrusion techniques to infer information from a hardware device
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know as the side channel attacks. As the crypto-GF circuits are mainly used in secu-
rity applications, they always prove to be the main focus of such attacks. Many such
attacks are reported in [36; 37; 38; 39].
As these researches suggest, in critical applications such as cryptography the faulty
operations can be carefully analyzed to reveal the secret information such as the secret
keys and the Intellectual Property (IP) of the chip. The intentional intrusion to reveal
such secret information is mainly classi ed into two major categories, namely, invasive
and non-invasive attacks as discussed below.
2.3.2.1 Invasive Attacks
The invasive attacks on VLSI chips are mainly done by physically breaking into the
chip. This implies that the attacker will physically damage the packaging of the chip
to expose the silicon die in order to obtain the secret information. Hence, the invasive
attacks usually need sophisticated and expensive laboratory set up. The two primary
forms of invasive attacks are radiation induced attacks using photo probing and reverse
engineering based on the optical imaging of the chips internal for IP theft [40].
Radiation Induced Attacks Radiation induced faults are primary type of invasive
attacks. In this, the attacker physically tampers the chip using chemicals and other
methods to expose the silicon die [40]. Fig. 2.5 shows example pictures of chip dies
exposed by various means [40].
Once the die is exposed, the attacker can impart controlled radiation beams or light
beams using a radiation probing mechanism in a laboratory environment. An example
setup of such a mechanism is as shown in Fig. 2.6.
Other high energy particles such as alpha, gamma, and other cosmic rays under
controlled laboratory set ups can also used be to inject temporal radiation based faults
at selected critical or sensitive parts of a chip. The attacker then records the response
of the chip under test to analyze the erroneous data. With the help of sophisticated
instruments, one can gather enough information to break the security aspects of a chips
[40].
26
2.3 Faults in Integrated Circuits
Figure 2.5: Integrated chips being exposed by various means [40].
Figure 2.6: Laser probing setup to induce transient error [40].
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IP Theft by Optical Imaging A certain class of attackers are more interested in
the IP of the chips rather than the information they process. Gathering the IP of a
particular IC may enable them to clone the IP and reproduce the chip violating the
copy protection rules. Such events are a major threat to big industries, which are
manufacturing game consoles, cell phones, high performance processors, etc.
Figure 2.7: Optical imaging and reverse engineering [41].
Fig. 2.7 shows an example picture of a chip whose internals are magni ed under
an electron microscope. From such optical imaging techniques, the attacker can eas-
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ily obtain the internal structure of the IC and perform a reverse engineering step to
reconstruct the whole IC and clone the IP.
2.3.2.2 Non-invasive Attacks
Non-invasive attacks are the ones in which the attacker extracts the required details
from the integrated chip without physically tampering. In order to achieve this target,
the hacker makes use of the weaknesses in hardware implementation of the chip or
the software that runs on the hardware. These weak channels leaking information
unintentionally to the outside world are known as the side channels. The side channels
of an IC can be its power consumption while it is performing some operations, the
Electro Magnetic Flux (EMF), timing pro le of algorithms while they are executed,
sound signatures, or even the test data from scan chains meant for testing the ICs.
As compared to the invasive attacks, the non-invasive attacks uses less complicated
and less expensive equipment to analyze and decode the side channel information.
However, the decoding of the side channels may require a high degree of expertise
and this may be reduced to a certain extent using sophisticated equipments for crypt
analysis.
Differential Power Analysis There are many reported articles related to the differ-
ential power analysis based attacks on VLSI circuits, speci cally the crypto-processors
[2; 42]. The classical approach of measuring power pro le is to measure the current
consumption by the hardware while performing various arithmetic operations. The
power dissipated for various operations are different from one another they are mea-
sured by inserting a resistance across the power or ground pin to get the equivalent
current. This recorded data is then statistically analysed to get the secret information
that the attacker is looking for [43].
Fig. 2.8 shows the current consumption of a processor during various execution
stages of a crypto-smart-card-processor. With proper equipments, such a pro le could
be decoded for other arithmetic operations as well. Thus by recognizing the power
pro le for logic 0 and logic 1, the scheme could be extended to understand the
power pro le of a combination of bits and hence the secret data that the hardware
processes.
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Figure 2.8: Basic example of differential power analysis [44].
Timing Attacks Similar to the power attacks, the timing signature of various algo-
rithms running on a cryptography hardware could be analyzed to predict the data that
the hardware is processing. In the case of cryptography hardware, the assumptions
made by an attacker can be narrowed down further as the application speci c crypto-
hardware implements a particular cryptography algorithm [44].
Figure 2.9: Basic example of differential timing attack [44].
Fig. 2.9 shows an example timing pro le of an algorithm [44]. By accumulat-
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ing information over various runs of the algorithm, one can gather major information
about the secret data, passwords, or even the secret public key of a particular crypto-
algorithm.
Electromagnetic Flux Similar to the timing and differential power spectrums, the
EMF around a cryptography hardware can also leak information in terms of electro
magnetic signals. There is little reported reported research on this area, such as in [45;
46], which successfully reported attacks based on EMF. It is observed that the current
consumptions by the CMOS transistor devices are data dependent. As the current
!ows through the nano CMOS switches, it produces EMF. The intensity of these !ux
depends on the switching frequency. This implies that the current !ow essentially
depends on the data the hardware is processing. Thus such data dependability EMF of
the nano devices can be exploited to leak information while they are in operation. An
example setup of the EMF based attack is shown in Fig. 2.10 [45].
Figure 2.10: Attack based on electro-magnetic !ux [45].
Scan Chain Based Attack Testability is one of the most vital features of modern
VLSI structures. A scan chain is integrated in almost all hardware present today. The
31
2.3 Faults in Integrated Circuits
primary requirement of the scan chain is to provide full external access (controllability
and observability) to all the modules within the hardware for testability against perma-
nent faults, such as stuck-at and stuck-open faults [47; 48]. However, this additional
feature could be misused for malicious gain in leaking out information from the hard-
ware. The application speci c processor for example could be fed with fault based test
vector sets and the response from the hardware could be observed to understand the
internals of the hardware. This has been under intense investigation for a number of
years and there are many published researches, e.g. in [49].
2.3.3 Hardware Trojans
Due to the increasing complexities in the fabrication process of the ICs, more and
more VLSI design industries are relying on off shore third party fabrication foundries.
Nowadays, none of the smaller industries, apart from a hand full of major industries,
have in house fabrication facilities owing to the enormous cost, complexities, and ef-
forts involved. As a result, after the fab-less design stages, i.e. from the tape out stage
of a design till it is manufactured, the designer has very little control over the rest of
the design cycle. In such scenarios, it is possible that someone with malicious inten-
sions to alter the actual design by adding or modifying the circuits in a very small and
potentially undetectable manner in order to leak out information to the outside world
without altering the basic functionality of the chip. Such additional circuitry added
for malicious gain is known as hardware Trojans [36; 50]. Depending upon the way
the additional circuitry (Trojan) is activated, there are several ways one can design
hardware trojans [36]. Having access to the whole design, it is not hard for a third
party to precisely insert an additional circuit that will not be activated in normal test-
ing phase of the chip. This makes such Trojans very dif cult to detect. The major
classi cations of hardware Trojans include circuits that introduce false logic into the
actual combinational logic when they are active, and circuitry that leaks information
over side channels such as wireless channel without affecting the actual functionality
of the chip [36; 51].
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2.4 Summary
This chapter brie!y explains the basics of  nite  eld and the arithmetic operations over
them. Further chapters in this thesis consider arithmetic circuits over GF(2m), hence
the basics of various basis such as polynomial basis and normal basis are brie!y ex-
plained. As  nite  eld circuits are mainly used in cryptographic application, reliability
of these circuits by various means of faults and attacks are brie!y explained in this
chapter. The main sources of faults and attacks are briefed out for completeness of the
thesis. However, further chapters of this thesis mainly focus on faults and attacks that
manipulate the logic functionality of the device.
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Chapter 3
Literature Review and Baseline
Research
3.1 Introduction
The range of wide varieties of application speci c VLSI hardware in modern day com-
puting include mobile and wireless networks, banking sectors, transportation, space
applications, commercial electronics equipments and defence applications. Hence
fault tolerant computing system design is an inevitable  eld in the VLSI hardware
industry as their unavailability at a particular time due to an error or a fault can be
catastrophic. Chapter 2 brie!y explains the major sources of faults and attacks in VLSI
circuits. However this thesis is mainly constrained to such attacks where the fault may
manipulate the logic function of the system hence giving invalid or erroneous results
at the output. It has been widely reported that attacks on VLSI hardware apart from
permanent stuck-at and stuck-open faults are mainly seen in cryptography related ap-
plications. This chapter hence conducts a literature survey of the most important fault
tolerant schemes in  nite  eld circuits and few of the other VLSI structures closely
related to the techniques presented in this thesis.
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3.2 Fault Resilience
As discussed in Chapter 2, the fault sources are vast and have unique properties. Even
though they differ in properties and the way of their occurrence, more often the end
effect is the same. In order to  nd a way of mitigating such faults or attacks, researches
have been carried out till today. Due to the divergent behavior of the faults and due
to the dissimilarities in architecture of the digital circuits, proposing a generic fault
tolerant scheme is quite hard. The fault tolerant architectures differ from one to an-
other depending on the nature of the faults that they deal with. Also, the fault tolerant
schemes are only an additional option to improve the reliability of the circuit. This
means, no fault tolerant schemes or architectures can guarantee 100% fault tolerance.
How ever they can tolerate the faults up to a certain extent and also make the hardware
based attack more dif cult. The requirement of fault resilient architectures in modern
crypto-VLSI circuits are well explained in [52].
Over the years, several mitigation schemes have been proposed to increase the
reliability of the digital integrated circuits. Research proves mainly two kind of circuits
are affected by faults or fault based attacks. They are memory circuits and hardware
circuits used in secure computing. The section 3.2 of this chapter hence summarise
the most relevant fault tolerant techniques reported in the public domain. This chapter
also brie!y explains the baseline research based on word error correction that has lead
to the development of other novel fault tolerant techniques explained in the following
chapters of this thesis.
3.2.1 Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR)
TMR is the most simple and commonly followed fault mitigation scheme of until to-
day. It gained popularity due to its ease of implementation. The fundamental operation
of TMR is based on hardware duplication. This means, the actual circuitry that needs
to be fault tolerant is replicated three times. A voter is then used to monitor the oper-
ation of the three identical circuits. The voter then compares the results of the circuits
at the end of the computation [53]. If two out of three circuits agree one result to be
correct, the voter stick to that as the  nal result of the circuit [54; 55; 56].
The block diagram of TMR is as shown in Fig. 3.1. Though TMR based design is
very easy to implement, it possesses a huge space overhead. Replicating the hardware
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Figure 3.1: Triple Modular Redundancy.
twice additional to the actual functional block itself would impose 200% area overhead.
In addition to the hardware replication, for a better decision making in TMR, one often
need a complex voter circuit that may take the area overhead much beyond 200%. This
is a huge drawback in application having restrictions in area and power consumption.
Another drawback of the approach is that the whole reliability of TMR depends
on the voter. Also the critical assumption made is that the error happens only in one
functional block out of three. Design complexity of the voter is also not trivial and
straightforward for better reliability.
3.2.2 Fault Tolerance by Error Detection
Error detection schemes are the most well known and widely reported method of fault
mitigation. This method is generally known as Concurrent Error Detection (CED).
In CED, the error occurrence is generally detected and !agged by extra circuitry that
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is added to the actual functional block. This means the error occurrence is detected
during the normal operation of the actual circuit. Hence the name Concurrent Error
Detection [57; 58; 59]. Depending upon whether the error has occurred or not, the
actual computation is either stalled or continued without interruption. Once the error
!ag is active, appropriate action should be taken to mitigate the error. This is done by
rolling back and recomputing from the point that is interrupted by the error. Some CED
schemes also modify the actual structure of the circuit to incorporate error detection
features in it. However such methods are architecture dependent and hence needing a
complex modi cation when changes to the existing circuit architecture is required.
Figure 3.2: Parity based error detection.
In [60], a parity based error detection scheme is reported. This is one among many
method for error detection in digital circuits. In parity based CED, a parity predictor
circuit is attached to the actual circuit under test. The primary input is passed to the
parity predictor simultaneously as compared to the main circuit. While the device
performs its operation, the parity is generated by the parity generator circuit causing
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no extra delay. Once the computation of the main circuitry is  nished, the output is
passed to the checker to be compared with the predicted parity for the occurrence of an
error. The basic architecture of a parity based CED is as shown in Fig. 3.2. Research
presented in [27; 61] presents CED on digit serial and systolic circuit architectures.
Another CED technique is based on scaling techniques. In scaling technique, the
input to the actual functional block is scaled up by some factor and the computation
is performed. After the computation, the functional correctness of the results are per-
formed by few GF divisions to remove the scaling factor. The research reported in
[62; 63] are examples for error detection based on scaling techniques.
Time redundancy based methods are also used in detecting errors during the run-
time. In time redundancy methods, the device is initially fed with the actual operands
and  rst computation is performed. In step 2, a shifted version of the inputs are fed into
the same circuit used for computation. At the end of the computation, the results of
the second operation is shifted back and compared with the  rst computation to check
the correctness of the result. Some of the research on time redundant techniques are
reported in [64; 65; 66].
An error detection scheme presented in [6] is based on invariant relation relation-
ships of the logic under test. This method utilises logic implication checks as a method
of detecting errors in the actual circuit. However the logic implication of a circuit is
purely dependent on the circuit and hence very complicated to generalise for other
circuits. Also it is not that straight forward to derive the logic implications of a large
circuit.
Though the reported CED techniques helps us to detect multiple error occurrence,
none of these techniques have the capability of correcting them. This is the major
drawback of the CED based error tolerant techniques. The detected error has to be dealt
with a time redundant manner to eliminate the error. This is often done by using roll
back and recompute causing huge time overhead and hence affecting the performance
of the actual circuit. This is often inappropriate in applications like cryptography.
3.2.3 Fault Tolerance using Error Correction Techniques
The main drawback with errors detection schemes is that it can cause a break in the
actual computation till the detected errors are successfully mitigated. This laid the
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foundation to research in ef cient error correction schemes. Though the error correc-
tion provides a platform for ef cient computing with an increase in reliability of the
device, the cost associated with it is often high. Also various applications need various
levels of error correction capabilities. For example memory circuits are well known
areas where error correction schemes are integrated initially. This is due to the high
requirement for storing and retrieving data from memories in the presence of various
error sources. Researches reported in [67; 68] explain effects of the errors in memory
circuits and some of the methods to mitigate such errors.
It is noted that not only memory modules but also the logic circuits that are vul-
nerable to faults need to be fault resilient. Owing to this fact, researches have made
efforts to develop ef cient error correcting architectures to correct single and multiple
errors in the logic circuits.
One among the most well known approach that is widely used for error correction is
Single Error Correction and Double Error Detection (SEC/DED). The SEC/DED tech-
nique is normally based on well known Hamming codes or Low Density Parity Codes
(LDPC). In this technique, the Hamming code based parity generator is attached to
the actual functional block to predict parity from the primary input. This means the
parity is predicted in parallel with the actual functional block. Once the parity is gener-
ated, those are passed along with the actual functional block outputs to error correction
block to check and correct any single bit error. With SEC/DED, one can either detect
two bit errors or correct single bit error. The most commonly used SEC/DED error
correction technique is based on well known Hamming code or LDPC code [68; 69].
However researches reported in [37; 69] have proposed error correction schemes to
correct 2 bit errors based on a split Hamming code based technique. In split Hamming
code technique, the odd and even bit of the functional block outputs are grouped and
encoded separately using Hamming codes. Both groups are dealt separately and hence
help us to detect two bit errors and correct single bit error in each group. However this
technique can not cop with more than one bit error in a single group. This means, if
two or more bit error occurs in either odd or even group, the whole system fails.
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It is evident from the above discussions that there are not many multiple error cor-
recting architectures for  nite arithmetic circuits which are the fundamental building
blocks of crypto-hardware. Due to the high fan out and gate sharing structure of the
 nite  eld arithmetic circuits, error or faults affecting a critical node (a gate whose
output is shared between many other gates) may prorogate multiple bit errors to the
output. Hence multiple error correcting architectures that can correct more than two
bit errors are vital to ensure reliability in crypto arithmetic circuits. The inner structure
of the  nite  eld multiplier and its susceptibility towards faults and the possibility of
producing multiple bit errors are discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
Though such additional circuits increase the reliability of the actual circuit, this is
often costly in terms of area overhead and delay overhead. This additional overhead
can affect the overall performance of the application speci c crypto-hardware. Hence
the main design challenge is to develop schemes that give a tradeoff between the the
performance, area, delay and power.
Following part of this chapter brie!y discusses a word level multiple error correct-
ing architecture based on Reed Solomon coding [13]. This section serves as a baseline
research that leads to other novel multiple error correcting architectures presented in
the following chapters.
3.3.1 Word Level Error Correction over GFCircuits using RSCodes
In word level error correction, the output bits of the actual circuit (GF arithmetic circuit
in this case) are grouped as words having multiple bits. Hence the name world level
multiple bit error correction.
The Reed-Solomon (RS) codes are well known multiple bit error correction algo-
rithms that has burst error correction capability. The RS codes were  rst proposed
by Reed and Solomon in 1960 [70]. RS codes became very popular and accepted in
fault tolerant computing and applications due to their burst error correction capability
in a noisy environment [20]. They fall into the category of Forward Error Correction
(FEC) codes, also known as linear block codes. They are known as linear block codes
because the output bits of a functional block that need to be error tolerant are grouped
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into linear blocks having multiple bits. In other words, the output bits are grouped
into several word blocks containing multiple bits per each word block. The parity bits
for each word block are then computed using a parity predictor circuit. The gener-
ated parity bits are unique to the individual word block. The RS codes are mainly
used in the communication bases application where burst error correction is required
mostly. In such application, the encoding and decoding of the bits are done more of
a sequential fashion than a parallel way. Hence, the RS error correction architecture
needs to be modi ed to enable multiple error correction in logic circuits such as  nite
 eld arithmetic circuits.
As the RS code treats the functional blocks output as a word block, they are pow-
erful in correcting errors that occur in a cluster among various blocks. Though it can
correct multiple bit errors, the main challenge is decoding the encoded RS code words.
The decoding is complex in RS codes as one deal with the bits as word blocks. Hence,
we need to  nd the error location (which block the error that has occurred) and what
is the correct value (magnitude) of that particular block. This is a dif cult task as
compared to the codes that with output bits treated individually despite as blocks.
Using RS codes along with  nite  eld arithmetic circuits is quite ef cient as both
work on extended binary  eld GF(2m)"In RS codes, each word block in the RS code
word is an element from the corresponding Galois  eld GF(2m).
As in any error correction code, The fundamental parameters of the RS code in-
clude:
The word blocks in a code word: n = 2m−1 (3.1)
Number of message bits: k ≤ mt (3.2)
Number of check bits: n− k = 2t ≤ mt (3.3)
Number of error to be corrected: t ≤ mt (3.4)
Minimum distance: dmin ≥ 2t+1 (3.5)
In order to to incorporate RS code based error correction, one need to appropri-
ately choose the  nite  eld and a generator polynomial over that  eld. The generator
polynomial and its root over the  nite  eld are the important parameters that decide
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the nature of the  eld and operations over that  eld. Let the roots be β i to β i+2t−1, the
generator polynomial be g(X).
Let us represent the original output bits from the functional block and the RS code
word using polynomials over  nite  elds. The coef cients of the polynomial are out-
put word blocks (that contains multiple bits organised as a word) and the parity word
blocks. Also the power of X represents the position of the word block in the code
word. The actual functional block output bits are represented as c(X) and the encoded
RS code word is denoted after encoding is represented as o(X). The polynomial that
represents the code word is related to the polynomial that represents the output bits
through the generator polynomial g(X). The generator polynomial can be represented
as,
g(X) = (X +β i)(X +β i+1) · · ·(X +β i+2t−2)(X +β i+2t−1) (3.6)
where t is number of word blocks that can be corrected.
The RS codeword that contain both the output bits of the functional block and the
parity bits can generated using the formula,
o(X) = c(X)g(X) (3.7)
If m(X) is of degree k−1 and g(X) is of degree 2t, then the resultant code word will be
of degree 2t+k−1= n−1. However, for practical purposes, systematic encoding has
the advantage of reducing the complexity in retrieving the original bits after decoding.
Systematic encoding means that the redundant information is appended to the original
message.
3.3.1.1 Reed-Solomon Encoding
The classical bit-parallel multiplier which is used as a design example is generated
using the method described in [29]. A GF(215) bit parallel multiplier has been con-
sidered as a design example that need to be made fault tolerant using the proposed RS
code based multiple error correction architecture. The basic block diagram of the fault
tolerant architecture for the mentioned design example is as shown in Fig. 3.3. The
architecture mainly consists of the actual functional unit that needs to be made fault
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tolerant, a parity bit generator, syndrome generation block, a decoder that  nds the
exact position of the erroneous word block and its magnitude and  nally the correction
logic (m XOR gates).
Figure 3.3: Basic block diagram of RS based error correction architecture.
The Table 3.3.1.1 shows the  eld elements of GF(23) that is generated using the
primitive polynomial P(x) = x3 + x +1. Each block of the RS code under considera-
tion belongs to this  eld.
Let us consider a bit parallel multiplier de ned over GF(215). The generator poly-
nomial considered is g(X) = (X + β )(X + β 2). i.e. g(X) = X2 + β 4X + β 3 having
roots β and β 2. The generator polynomial is then used to encode the output bits of the
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Table 3.1: Field elements GF(8) with P(x) = x3+ x+1
Element Representation
0 000
1 001
β 010
β 2 100
β 3 =β+1 011
β 4=β 2+β 110
β 5=β 2+β + 1 111
β 6=β 2+0 + 1 101
β 7= 1 001
15-bit bit parallel multiplier in to word blocks containing both the multiplier output as
well as the parity bits.
The multiplier outputs are represented as
→
c = [c0,c1,c2, . . . ,c14]
T . Using RS en-
coding, the 15-bit multiplier outputs are grouped into 5 word blocks with 3 bits in each
block. Each block is de ned over the  eld GF(23) as shown in Table 3.3.1.1. The  ve
3-bit word blocks are denoted using C4,C3,C2,C1, and C0 respectively. The explained
example corrects one word block out of 7 (means, t = 1). This means it eventually
correct 3 bits at a time providing multiple error correction.
Let RP1 and RP0 denotes the two word blocks containing parity bits that are gen-
erated from the input operand bits. Using the formula RP(x) = xn−kC(x) mod g(x), a
closed close expression for RP1 and RP0 can be derived. That is,
RP0 = βC4+βC3+β
3C2+C1+β
3C0 (3.8)
RP1 = β
4C4+β
5C3+β
5C2+C1+β
4C0 (3.9)
However, the terms C4,C3, ·,C0 refers to the word blocks having 3 bits each. They are
44
3.3 Baseline research
computes as,
C4 = (c14,c13,c12)
C3 = (c11,c10,c9)
C2 = (c8, c7,c6)
C1 = (c5, c4,c3)
C0 = (c2, c1,c0) (3.10)
Once the C values are calculated, the co-ef cient terms βCs′ of Equation 3.8 and
3.9 are calculated as follows,
βC4 = (c13,c14+ c12,c14).
βC3 = (c10,c11+ c9,c11).
β 3C2 = (c8+ c7,c8+ c7+ c6,c8+ c6).
C1 = (c5,c4,c3).
β 4C0 = (c2+ c1+ c0,c1+ c0,c2+ c1). (3.11)
Substituting Equation 3.10 and 3.11 in Equations 3.8, we get:
RP0 = (rp02,rp01,rp00).
rp02 = c13+ c10+ c8+ c7+ c5+ c2+ c1+ c0.
rp01 = c14+ c12+ c11+ c9+ c8+ c7+ c6+ c4+ c1+ c0.
rp00 = c14+ c11+ c8+ c6+ c3+ c2+ c1.
rp02 = d13+ e13+ e12+d10+ e10+ e9+d8+ e8+d7+ e6+d5+ e5+ e4
+ d2+d1+d0+ e0.
rp01 = d14+ e13+d11+ e11+ e10+d9+ e9+d8+d7+d6+ e5+d4+ e4
+ e3+d1+ e1+d0.
rp00 = d14+ e14+ e13+d11+ e11+ e10+d8+ e8+ e7+d6+ e6+ e5+d3
+ e3+d2+ e1+d1+ e1+ e0. (3.12)
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Similarly, individual terms of Equation 3.9 is computed as:
β 4C4 = (c14+ c13+ c12,c13+ c12,c14+ c13).
β 5C3 = (c10+ c9,c9,c11+ c10+ c9).
β 5C2 = (c8+ c7,c6,c8,c7+ c6).
C1 = (c5,c4,c3).
β 4C0 = (c2+ c1+ c0,c1+ c0,c2+ c1). (3.13)
Equation 3.13 then substituted in Equation 3.9 to derive level expression for RP1 as
following:
RP1 = (rp12,rp11,rp10).
rp12 = c14+ c13+ c12+ c10+ c9+ c8+ c7+ c5+ c2+ c1+ c0.
rp11 = c13+ c12+ c9+ c6+ c4+ c1+ c0.
rp10 = c14+ c13+ c11+ c10+ c9+ c8+ c7+ c6+ c3+ c2+ c1.
rp12 = d14+ e13+d12+ e10+ e9+d9+ e8+ e7+d7+ e6+ e7+d5+ e4+ e5
+ d2+d1+d0+ e0.
rp11 = d13+ e13+ e12+d12+ e10+ e9+d9+ e8+ e7+d6+ e6+ e5+d4+ e4+ e3
+ d1+d1+d0.
rp10 = d14+ e14+d13+ e12+d11+ e11+d10+d9+ e8+d7+ e7+ e6
+ d3+ e3+ e2+d1+ e1+ e0. (3.14)
The expressions detailed above are used to design the RS parity prediction block
as shown in Fig. 3.3.
3.3.1.2 Error position and Magnitude Detection
Once the parity check bits are generated, they can be used to determine the occurrence
of an error in any of the word blocks. In order to provide suf cient information to
the decoder, a set of syndromes are generated from the parity bits generated. The
fundamental steps of decoding includes:
• Detecting the presence of an error during computation.
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• Locating the position of the erroneous block (word block that is in error).
• Computation of the actual magnitude (value) of the located erroneous block.
• Correction of the erroneous bits using the computed magnitude.
In this design example, the considered value is t = 1 . This means the the design ex-
ample can detect one erroneous word block (3 bits/block) out of seven word blocks (5
blocks containing multiplier outputs and 2 blocks containing the parity RP0 and RP1).
The decoding is done using well known Peterson-Gorenstein-Zierler (PGZ) algorithm
[19]. Even though there are many decoding algorithms that have been proposed for RS
decoding, the PGZ algorithm is the one having less computational complexity for least
t values [20]. According to PGZ algorithm C(x) denote the encoded multiplier output
RS code word. The erroneous code word r(x) can be represented as,
r(x) =C(X)+ e(x) (3.15)
where e(x) represents the error pattern that happened during the actual computation of
the multiplier. The syndrome values, denoted by Sis, are obtained by substituting the
root βi to the erroneous code word r(x). This can be represented as,
Si = r(β
i) =
n−1
∑
j=0
r j(β
i) j,1≤ i≤ 2t. (3.16)
The syndromes are used to predict the error occurrence. In case of an error the
syndrome will have a non zero value. The syndromes S1 and S2 are computed as
below,
Si = r(β
i) =
2
∑
j=1
r j(β
i) j,1≤ i≤ 2. (3.17)
Let the multiplier output is represented in terms of RS code word as,
C(X) =C4X
6+C3X
5+C2X
4+C1X
3+C0X
2+RP1X +RP0. (3.18)
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Then the syndrome S1 = (s12,s11,s10) is generated by:
S1 =C4β
6+C3β
5+C2β
4+C1β
3+C0β
2+RP1β +RP0. (3.19)
The individual expressions of Equation 3.19 is computed as:
β 6C4 = (c12,c14,c13+ c12).
β 5C3 = (c10+ c9,c9,c11+ c10+ c9).
β 4C2 = (c8+ c7+ c6,c7+ c6,c8+ c7).
β 3C1 = (c5+ c4,c5+ c4+ c3,c5+ c3).
β 2C0 = (c2+ c0,c1+ c0,c1).
β 1RP1 = (rp11,rp12+ rp10,rp12).
RP0 = (rp02,rp01,rp00). (3.20)
Substituting Equation 3.20 in Equation 3.19 to get the the bit expressions of S1 as
following:
s12 = c12+ c10+ c8+ c7+ c6+ c5+ c4+ c2+ c0+ rp11+ rp02.
s11 = c14+ c9+ c7+ c6+ c5+ c4+ c3+ c1+ c0+ rp12+ rp10+ rp01.
s10 = c13+ c12+ c11+ c10+ c9+ c8+ c7+ c5+ c3+ rp10+ rp12+ rp00.(3.21)
Similarly, the syndrome S2 = (s22, s21,s20) can be evaluated using the polynomial
by substituting the root β 2 as,
S2 =C4β
12+C3β
10+C2β
8+C1β
6+C0β
4+RP1β
2+RP0. (3.22)
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The individual terms of S2 is computed in the following way:
S2 = C4β
5+C3β
3+C2β
1+C1β
6+C0β
4+RP1β
2+RP0.
β 5C4 = (c13+ c12,c12,c14+ c13+ c12).
β 3C3 = (c11+ c10,c11+ c10+ c9,c11+ c9).
β 1C2 = (c7,c8+ c6,c8).
β 6C1 = (c2,c5,c4+ c3).
β 4C0 = (c2+ c1+ c0,c1+ c0,c2+ c1).
β 2RP1 = (rp12+ rp10,rp12+ rp11,rp11).
RP0 = (rp02,rp01,rp00). (3.23)
Using Equation 3.23, the bit expressions for S2 are calculated as following:
s22 = c13+ c12+ c11+ c10+ c7+ c2+ c1+ rp12+ rp10+ rp02).
s21 = c12+ c11+ c10+ c9+ c8+ c6+ c5+ c1+ c0+ rp12+ rp11+ rp01.
s20 = c14+ c13+ c12+ c11+ c9+ c8+ c4+ c3+ c2+ c1+ rp11+ rp00. (3.24)
Once the syndromes are generated, they are passed to the RS decoder to evaluate
the error location and the magnitude. The implementation of PGZ algorithm for RS
decoding is given by,
X =
S2
S1
(3.25)
The error magnitude is given by,
Y =
S21
S2
(3.26)
Once the decoding is completed, the error location (the location of the word block
that is in error) and its magnitude (the actual value) are received. That information
then be used to correct the multiple bits contained in the erroneous word block.
3.3.2 Experimental Results
A behavioural model of the actual multiplier circuit and the error correction block is
implemented using VHDLTM. A 15-bit bit parallel GF multiplier has been considered
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for evaluating the functional correctness as well as for estimating other characteris-
tics such as area overhead. However the proposed technique can be easily scaled to
GF multipliers of any size. The design was simulated using ModelsimTM and was
tested for functionality by giving various random input vectors. The outputs from the
VHDLTM coded architecture are also validated against a standard multiplier function
to ensure the functional correctness. The architectures were synthesized using the
SynopsysTM design compiler and Synopsys Power CompilerTM to estimate the area
and power consumption. Here, one of the random error injected in to the multiplier
produced multiple bit errors in word block C3 that corresponds to 6
th word block in
the output RS code. The 7 word blocks generated are C4, C3,C2, C1,C0, RP1 and
RP0 respectively. Fig. 3.4 clearly shows the injected error in 6
th word block (changed
from 000 to 101), the computed erroneous location, magnitude and the corrected  nal
output.
Figure 3.4: VHDL functional simulation of the multiple error correction technique.
Table 3.2: Hardware overhead for GF(215) Multiplier with Multiple Error Correction
[13]
Field Multiplier area PP and Other Circuitry %
size in µm2 area in µm2 Overhead
GF(215) 8681.70 15958.868 184.82
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The area overhead of the proposed multiple error correcting technique for the spec-
i ed 15-bit multiplier design example is shown in Table 3.3.2. The overhead is shown
to be 185 %. However this preliminary design example proved to be more ef cient
than the well known and widely used N-modular redundancy scheme and corrects a
great number of bit errors than SEC/DED schemes. Hence the proposed preliminary
scheme enhance the reliability of the  nite  eld arithmetic circuits.
3.4 Summary
This chapter brie!y outlines the well known fault tolerant schemes that are used in the
fault tolerant GF arithmetic circuit design. The discussed techniques from literature re-
view include the CED schemes, error correction schemes such as SEC/DED schemes.
The merits and demerits of those schemes have been investigated. Detailed investiga-
tion of GF arithmetic circuits and the nature of multiple bit errors shows that multiple
bit error correction schemes are inevitable for fault tolerance in GF circuits. On the
basis of this, this chapter also describes the base line research for multiple error detec-
tion for PB multipliers over GF(2m)based on well known RS codes. The multiple error
correction architecture using the RS codes are explained brie!y using a design exam-
ple. The designs are modeled and simulated using industry standard EDA tools and its
functional correctness and area overhead has been reported for performance measure.
This baseline research serves as a stepping stone towards other novel contributions
detailed in the following chapters of this thesis.
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Chapter 4
BCH code Based Multiple-bit Error
Correction over Bit-parallel GF
Multipliers
4.1 Introduction
Malfunctioning of the integrated circuits (ICs) caused by numerous fault or error sources
can be a nightmare in critical applications. Various faults that affect the reliability
of the secure hardware devices can be permanent faults or temporary transient faults
[5; 6]. Signi cant research has been undertaken towards analyzing the impact of faults
on semiconductor based ICs and methodologies to mitigate them. Due to the high
device densities, large fan out, and special interest on the information they process, se-
cure hardware devices such as crypto-arithmetic circuits are easily vulnerable to faults.
Faults may be either natural or intentional [38]. In either case, such devices must be
fault tolerant to ensure their reliability. The main problem of faults or attacks that
manipulate logic functionality of the hardware circuit is that a single induced or per-
manent stuck at fault at any of the critical node of the device can cause multiple errors
at output. This is due to the high fan-out of the GF arithmetic circuits. Also with
sophisticated imaging technologies and electron microscopes, one can  nd the critical
node in a circuit and inject random faults into the circuit in one of the many ways dis-
cussed in Chapter 2. Natural faults occurring at critical nodes have the same impact as
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that of fault based attacks. Hence a novel scheme that can address multiple bit errors
is very important.
Owing to these facts, this chapter presents two novel multiple error correcting de-
sign techniques based on Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem (BCH) codes that can correct
burst errors. The proposed architecture is designed to address the high area overhead
of TMR, the time redundancy of CED and roll back, and to enable multiple error
correction, which is missing in most of the existing single error correcting designs.
Also unlike the techniques of [37; 71], which consider errors that occur only within
the functional block, the presented scheme considers the errors both in the functional
block as well as the redundant bit generation block. In this regard, the  rst method can
correct multiple transient errors anywhere within the design with a penalty of only an
extra decoder delay. In the second method, this has been further improved with novel
bypass circuitry, which is capable of saving the critical path delays by up to 50%.
4.2 The Proposed Methodology for Multiple Bit Error
Correction
Among the available error correcting schemes, there are no multiple error correcting
architectures for GF arithmetic circuits in the current literature. Due to the nature of
faults and the multiple errors caused by them, this section investigates the possibilities
of a multiple error correction scheme that can correct up to t random bit errors at the
output including those in the correction block. The presented architecture is based
on optimized BCH codes. This section explains the BCH error correction scheme to
mitigate radiation induced temporal errors in detail along with its ef cient hardware
implementation. The literature survey shows that, the techniques presented in this
chapter are the  rst to investigate such a scheme for fault tolerant Galois Field circuits.
However the scope of the proposed technique here is to focus on the errors that happen
on the internal nodes of the circuit. Hence assumption made is that the primary input
is error free.
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4.2.1 Bose-Choudhury-Hocquenghem Code
The Bose-Choudhury-Hocquenghem (BCH) codes belong to the family of cyclic codes
in which the message block is encoded using a polynomial g(x), called the generator
polynomial. The generator polynomial is the least common multiplier (LCM) of the
minimal polynomial for the selected powers with respect to GF(2m), provided that
each of the minimal polynomials should appear only once in the product. Here, the
message is treated as a whole block and encoded one at a time rather than encoding
continuously as in the case of convolution codes. The encoder block possesses no
memory, hence no information of the previous message blocks is available. This style
of encoding can be thought of as sliding an encoding window over the message bits. In
conventional BCH codes, the LFSR structure is used to encode incoming message bits
one at a time. Hence, the present encoded bit depends on the previous bit, which shows
that a memory is being used. In the proposed scheme, a parallel implementation of the
BCH encoder is introduced which encodes the message as a whole block and uses
no memory. The binary BCH codes are generalized Hamming codes. The BCH codes
detect and correct randomly located bit errors in a stream of information bits according
to its error correction capability (t). The burst error correcting codes, such as the Reed-
Solomon codes, correct multiple errors within a symbol or multiple symbols, but all
the bit errors must be within the same symbol. The most interesting aspect of the BCH
codes over the Reed-Solomon codes for the multiple error correction is the simplicity
in decoding the codewords. In this case, the bits location only needs to be determined
and not the correct value, as in the case of the Reed-Solomon codes. The basic block
diagram of the generic multiple bit error correction circuit using the binary BCH code
is shown in Fig. 4.1(a). The overall design contains a redundant bit generation block
that works in parallel with the functional block, an error detection and decoding block
that detects the occurrence of an error and its location, and  nally a decoder, apart from
the bit parallel multiplier functional block.
4.2.2 BCH Encoder and Decoder Design
The complete design of a BCH parallel encoder and decoder with an example is now
discussed. The bit parallel multiplier architecture is adopted from [29]. The general
representation of BCH code is BCH(n,k,d), where n is the size of the codeword or,
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Figure 4.1: BCH code based multiple detection and correction architectures. (a) Mul-
tiple error correction architecture; (b) Error detection and correction block.
in other words, it is the sum of the message length k, and the number of parity bits p
used for encoding, and d is the minimum distance (dmin) between the codewords. The
possible BCH codes for m≥ 3 and t < 2m−1 is given by the following expressions:
Block length: n = 2m−1 (4.1)
Number of check bits: n− k ≤ mt (4.2)
Minimum distance: dmin ≥ 2t+1 (4.3)
The codeword is formed by adding the remainder after dividing the shifted mes-
sage block by a generator polynomial g(x). All the codewords are multiples of the
generator polynomial. The generator polynomial is not just a minimal primitive poly-
nomial, but a combination of several polynomials corresponding to the powers of the
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primitive element α ∈ GF(2m). In other words, g(x) is the least common multiple of
the minimal polynomials over the various powers of the primitive element α (powers
from α,α2, . . . ,α2t , where t is the error correction capability of the code). Then,
g(x) = LCM
(
m1(x),m2(x), . . . ,m2t(x)
)
(4.4)
where m1(x),m2(x), . . . ,m2t(x) are the minimal polynomials corresponding to the var-
ious powers of α . It is also noted that every even power of a primitive element has the
same minimal polynomial. Hence Eq. (4.4) is simpli ed to the following:
g(x) = LCM
(
m1(x),m3(x), . . . ,m2t−1(x)
)
. (4.5)
The basic principle and design of the bit-parallel BCH code based multiple error
correction scheme is explained with an example as follows. Let us consider a sim-
ple case of BCH(15,5,7), where n = 15 and k = 5. In this fairly small example, a
bit-parallel PB multiplier over GF(25) is considered. Let c = [co,c1,c2,c3,c4] be the
outputs of the multiplier. Then,
M(x) = c4x
4+ c3x
3+ c2x
2+ c1x+ c0. (4.6)
xn−kM(x) = xn−k(c4x
4+ c3x
3+ c2x
2+ c1x+ c0)
= c4x
14+ c3x
13+ c2x
12+ c1x
11+ c0x
10. (4.7)
as in this case n = 15 and k = 5.
The redundant bits are generated by the following:
P(x) = xn−kM(x) mod g(x). (4.8)
Let α be the primitive element of GF(24). The elements of GF(24) is shown in Table
4.1. Here, P(x) = x4 + x+ 1 is the primitive polynomial. The three minimal polyno-
mials m1(x), m3(x), and m5(x) are given by:
m1(x) = x
4+ x+1, (4.9)
m3(x) = x
4+ x3+ x2+ x+1, (4.10)
m5(x) = x
2+ x+1. (4.11)
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Table 4.1: GF(24) elements in PB.
GF(24) elements Bit vector
0 0000
1 0001
α 0010
α2 0100
α3 1000
α4 0011
α5 0110
α6 1100
α7 1011
α8 0101
α9 1010
α10 0111
α11 1110
α12 0100
α13 1111
α14 1001
For three bit error correction (t = 3), the generator polynomial for constructing the
codeword is then given by the following:
g(x) = LCM
(
m1(x),m3(x),m5(x)). (4.12)
Substituting the minimal polynomials, the following expression is obtained:
g(x) = x10+ x8+ x5+ x4+ x2+ x+1. (4.13)
Substituting the generating polynomial, the following expression is obtained:
P(x) = p9x
9+ p8x
8+ p7x
7+ p6x
6+ p5x
5+ p4x
4+ p3x
3
+p2x
2+ p1x
1+ p0.. (4.14)
where,
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p0 = c0+ c2+ c4,
p0 = d0+d2+d4+ e0+ e1+ e2+ e3,
p1 = c0+ c1+ c2+ c3+ c4,
p1 = d0+d1+d2+d3+d4,
p2 = c0+ c1+ c3,
p2 = d0+d1+d3+ e1+ e2+ e3,
p3 = c1+ c2+ c4,
p3 = d1+d2+d4+ e0+ e2+ e3,
p4 = c0+ c3+ c4,
p4 = d0+d3+d4+ e0+ e2,
p5 = c0+ c1+ c2,
p5 = d0+d1+d2+ e2,
p6 = c1+ c2+ c3,
p6 = d1+d2+d3+ e0+ e3,
p7 = c2+ c3+ c4,
p7 = d2+d3+d4+ e1,
p8 = c0+ c2+ c3,
p8 = d0+d2+d3+ e0+ e1+ e3,
p9 = c1+ c3+ c4,
p9 = d0+d3+d4+ e0+ e2. (4.15)
where the d and e terms are the inner product terms of the multiplier [29]. Hence,
the  nal BCH encoded codeword for the bit parallel GF multiplier circuit is given as
the following expression:
E(x) = c4x
14+ c3x
13+ c2x
12+ c1x
11+ c0x
10+ p9x
9
+p8x
8+ p7x
7+ p6x
6+ p5x
5+ p4x
4
+p3x
3+ p2x
2+ p1x+ p0. (4.16)
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The redundant bits (check bits) are generated by a parallel redundant bit generation
unit as shown in Figure 4.1(a). The resulting parity bits along with the multiplier
outputs are passed on to the error detection and correction block (syndrome generation
and decoding) as shown in Figure 4.1(b). For three bit error correction capability (t =
3), six (2× t) syndromes need to be generated. The syndromes help us to determine
whether the computed multiplication results are error free or not. In case of error free
computation, the syndromes will be evaluated to zero. If the syndromes are nonzero,
then that !ags an erroneous computation. The syndromes are calculated using the
following expression:
Si(x) = E(x)|x=1,α ,...,α2t . (4.17)
The syndrome decoding is done by using the well known Peterson-Gorenstein-
Zierler algorithm. In the proposed technique only three syndromes are used to predict
and correct errors instead of 6 syndromes as in the case of classical BCH scheme. This
would reduce the area of the whole implementation. Here for three bit error correction,
one has to calculate only syndromes S1, S3, and S5. The generalized equation for
syndromes for this example of BCH(15,5,7) are given as follows:
S1 = s13α3+ s12α2+ s11α + s10.
S3 = s33α3+ s32α2+ s31α + s30.
S5 = s53α3+ s52α2+ s51α + s50. (4.18)
The equivalent bit expressions of all syndromes are given by the terms:
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s10 = c4+ c3+ c2+ c0+ p8+ p7+ p4+ p0
s11 = c2+ c1+ c0+ p9+ p7+ p5+ p4+ p1
s12 = c3+ c2+ c1+ c0+ p8+ p6+ p5+ p2
s13 = c4+ c3+ c2+ c1+ p9+ p7+ p6+ p3
s30 = c4+ c0+ p9+ p5+ p4+ p0
s31 = c4+ c3+ p9+ p8+ p4+ p3
s32 = c4+ c2+ p9+ p7+ p4+ p2
s33 = c4+ c3+ c2+ c1+ p9+ p8+ p7+ p6+ p4+ p3+ p2+ p1
s50 = c4+ c2+ c1+ p9+ p8+ p6+ p5+ p3+ p2+ p0
s51 = c4+ c3+ c1+ c0+ p8+ p7+ p5+ p4+ p2+ p1
s52 = c4+ c3+ c1+ c0+ p8+ p7+ p5+ p4+ p2+ p1
s53 = 0. (4.19)
Determining whether the computation is error free is not suf cient; It is also needed
to correct these errors if they are present. For this, the error positions or error locations
of the erroneous bits have to be calculated. To determine the error positions effectively,
one has to decode the syndromes. The syndrome decoding block (error detection and
correction block represented as an ECB block) of the BCH based error correction tech-
nique contains an error locator polynomial generator block that  nds the root of the er-
ror locator polynomial and a decoder that eventually corrects the erroneous bits based
on the computed error position. For this purpose the computed syndrome values are
passed on to the error locator polynomial computation block, as shown in Fig. 4.1. For
the three (t = 3) bit error correction, one need three (t = 3) coef cients for the error
locator polynomial. Let σ1, σ2, and σ3 be the three coef cients of the error locator
polynomial. Then they are calculated as follows:
σ1 = S1, (4.20)
σ2 =
(
(S12S3)+S5
)
(S13+S3)
, and (4.21)
σ3 = (S1
3+S3+S1σ2). (4.22)
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4.2.3 Improved Error Locator Design
Once the error locator polynomial is available, the roots of the polynomial will give
the error locations. The traditional algorithms for  nding the roots of the error locator
polynomial are based on exhaustive search methods. Another scheme for  nding the
roots is the Chien search algorithm, in which all the possible values of the primitive el-
ement α , ranging from α0,α, . . . ,α2m−1, are inserted into the error locator polynomial
to check if they satisfy the polynomial. In the proposed design, a bit parallel imple-
mentation of the area optimized Chien search algorithm is proposed. In particular, a
scheme is proposed in which the root of the error locator polynomial is checked only
among the powers of the primitive element α corresponding to the bit positions of the
message bits, i.e. the multiplier output bits. The roots of the error locator polynomial
corresponding to the parity bits are omitted in order to reduce the hardware complexity
and hence the chip area. For a 5-bit multiplier, the check is performed to  nd whether
α1,α2,α3,α4,α5 are roots of the error locator polynomial, which in turn corresponds
to the bit positions c4,c3,c2,c1 and c0 in the output of the multiplier. In other words,
if α is a root of the error locator polynomial, it says that the bit c4 of the multiplier is
erroneous, etc.
The decoder corrects the erroneous bit(s) corresponding to the information pro-
vided by the parallel root search block. Based on this design principle, the design is
extended to a 16-bit parallel PB multiplier over GF(216) and to a 45-bit parallel PB
multiplier over GF(245).
4.2.4 Optimized Decoder Design
The Chien search block produces information about the error location or error loca-
tions, depending on the number of errors present in the computation. Once the error
position is known, this information is passed on to the decoder for correction. The de-
coder block is a tree of XOR gates that does pairwise two input XOR operations over
the actual multiplication result and the correction value from the Chien search block.
In theory, if a bit is in error, the corresponding correction bit from the Chien search
block is an inverted value of the bit in error. Hence doing a simple XOR operation in
turn does a bit !ip that will restore the correct functional value out of the correction
block as shown in Fig. 4.1(b).
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4.2.5 Implementation Details
The design was simulated in ModelsimTM . Figure 4.2 shows the snapshot of a typ-
ical ModelsimTM simulation result. During the simulations, the faults are introduced
into the multiplier outputs randomly for checking the error correction capability of the
proposed scheme. The highlighted parts in Figure 4.2 show one of the many testing
values. The errors are introduced in the intermediate stages of the multiplier, which in
turn gave multiple bit errors at the multiplier output. In this case the errors are at bit
positions 1, 2, and 16, however the cout values show the corrected  nal output from
the BCH decoder. Although the example designs considered 2 to 5-bit error correction
capability, based on the theory presented in this chapter, the capability can be extended
to more than  ve bits and also to any digital circuit in general.
Figure 4.2: Simulation results of BCH code based multiple error correction.
4.2.6 Comparison with Existing Approaches
The area overhead for the various designs with 2, 3, 4 and 5 error correction capability
for a 45-bit multiplier is shown in Fig. 4.3(a). It is observed that for a  xed size
multiplier, the area increases with the number of bit error corrections.
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Figure 4.3: Area overhead analysis for comparative perspective. (a) Overhead analysis
of BCH based error correction scheme; (b) Block wise area of a 45-bit GF multiplier
with 3-bit error correction.
The area of the various blocks in the proposed multiple error correction scheme is
shown in Fig. 4.3(b). The additional area contribution to the over all design is due to
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the parity predictor block and the Chien search root  nding block.
Table 4.2: Comparison with other approaches for 45-bit multiplier.
Property TMR [37] [69] Proposed Proposed Proposed
#Error correction multiple single single 3 Errors 4 Errors 5 Errors
Coding technique Voting Hamming LDPC BCH BCH BCH
Overhead >200% >130% 120% 150.4% 164.04% 170.4%
Table 4.2 compares the area overhead of the proposed approach with other existing
related error detection or correction methods appeared in the literature.
Furthermore, for a given error correction capability, the extra hardware overhead
comes down signi cantly as the main multiplier block size increases. For example,
for the 5-, 16-, and 45-bit multipliers, it is observed that the extra hardware is 600%,
240%, and 150.4%, respectively, for 3-bit error correction capability.
4.3 Extension to Intelligent and Dynamically Error Cor-
rectable Architecture
From the above discussions, it is noted that the BCH error correction block runs in par-
allel with the example  nite  eld multiplier circuit all the time irrespective of the error
position or location. In other words, the error correction block in the entire circuitry
contributes towards the critical path delay almost all the time, thus affecting the speed
of operation, which is a vital factor in most of the present day VLSI systems. Hence
immense care has to be taken to reduce this factor as much as possible. In the proposed
error correction scheme, one needs the error correction block to be active only in case
of a fault or error. In this section, a scheme is proposed to intelligently activate the
ECB block only when there is an error injected or a fault has occurred in the circuit on
the !y. This scheme is proposed on the premise that the probability of occurrence of
an error is very low, e.g., it may happen only once in a million clock cycles. Therefore,
a modi cation is done on the proposed architecture to dynamically (on the !y) correct
the errors as they appear. This would free the design from unwanted delay penalties
due to the decoder block and make it more ef cient. When errors occur, the clock cy-
cle is dynamically extended by a gated clock and the data is captured in the following
64
4.3 Extension to Intelligent and Dynamically Error Correctable Architecture
clock edge instead of the current clock edge where the errors appeared. This novel
scheme would give !exibility and time for the ECB block to be active and compute
the correct results from the parity information that is computed in parallel with the
multiplier and give the correct result in the following clock cycle. It should be noted
that, this is unlike CED and rollback, in which once an error is detected, other system
operations are halted until the re-computation is  nished. In the proposed technique,
this problem does not occur as the system runs without stalling.
4.3.1 The Proposed Extended Architecture
The critical path of the error correcting architecture without the dynamic error correc-
tion capability is shown in Fig. 4.4. Clearly, when no error is present in the design dur-
ing a speci c clock cycle, the critical path has the added delay of the decoder block.
In order to mitigate this issue, the architecture in Fig. 4.1(a) has been redesigned as
shown in Fig. 4.5(a). In comparison with the architecture in Fig. 4.1(a) the proposed
extended design has extra circuitry (with a minor hardware penalty) that checks for
the occurrence of an error. If no errors occurred during a multiplication operation, the
output is directly taken from the GF multiplier bypassing the computation result of the
error correction block. If there is a bit !ip at the multiplier output as a result of faults,
the error monitoring circuitry sets a !ag bit EN. Once the EN bit is high (indicating
the error), the GF multiplier result computed at the current clock cycle will be omitted
and an extra clock cycle will be given for correction. The corrected output will be
available in the next clock cycle. This is done using a clocked gate and an AND gate
array as shown in Fig. 4.5(a). Depending upon the signal EN, the critical path of the
design takes either path-i or path-ii as shown in Figure 4.5(d). The critical path is i
when EN signal is low (no error) and path ii is taken when EN is high (error occurred).
The timing diagram of the proposed extended design is shown in Fig. 4.6. The signal
ECLK follows the CLK as long as no errors occurred. Once EN signal goes high that
in turn drives ECLK to go low for one clock cycle. This adjustment enables the circuit
to provide a clock cycle delay for the error correction. However this happens only if
there is an error in the functional block. Otherwise, ECLK is the same as the global
CLK and the output follows the multiplier and hence no delay of the ECB block is
65
4.3 Extension to Intelligent and Dynamically Error Correctable Architecture
added to the overall delay. The details of the error detection logic and correction block
are shown in Fig. 4.5(b) and Fig. 4.5(c), respectively.
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Figure 4.4: Critical path of a BCH code based multiple ECB circuit without dynamic
error correction technique.
4.3.2 Prototyping of the Extended Design
To validate and compare the proposed technique, the schemes both in BCH and ex-
tended Hamming code [69] based double error correction designs have been imple-
mented. For analysis, two structures (16- and 45-bit multipliers) are implemented with
both BCH and double error correcting Hamming structure (paring both even and odd
bits of the multiplier separately). These structures are then extended to dynamically
error correctable structures as discussed in the previous sections. Table 4.3 shows the
comparison of attributes such as the chip area, power, and delay of 16-bit versus the
45-bit PB GF multipliers. These designs are synthesized in both 180 nm and 90 nm
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Figure 4.5: The proposed fault tolerant architecture and architectural components with
dynamic error detection and correction technique: (a) The proposed architecture of
a dynamically error correctable GF-ECB circuit; (b) Error detection block; (c) AND
array; and (d) Critical paths in new proposed scheme.
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Figure 4.6: Timing diagram of the proposed fault tolerant architecture.
TSMCTM technology. Table 4.4 shows the delay overhead due to the error correction
circuitry for the 16-bit and 45-bit BCH code based error correction scheme and similar
sized Hamming code based scheme. With the proposed scheme, in the absence of an
error, the computation delay is signi cantly reduced by bypassing the error correction
block, which in turn speeds up the overall computation time.
Table 4.3: Comparison of 16-bit versus 45-bit GF multiplier speci cations.
Mult. Size Area (um2) T-Power (uW ) Delay (nS) Area (um2) T-Power (uW ) Delay (nS)
(180nm) (180nm) (180nm) (90nm) (90nm) (90nm)
16-bit Mult. 10863.2 489 3.11 3029.4 78.5 0.6
45-bit Mult. 77514.5 3300 6.86 19795.6 375.46 1.06
Further comparison is presented in Fig. 4.7 and Fig. 4.8 with regard to the 16-
and 45-bit multipliers. Fig. 4.7 shows the percentage area overhead comparison of
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Table 4.4: Delay comparison of ECB blocks BCH vs Hamming.
Scheme 180nm 90nm
BCH(31,16) 7.8nS 1.95nS
Ham(24,16) 2.65nS 0.5nS
BCH(63,45) 11.76nS 2.37nS
Ham(55,45) 4.54nS 1.1nS
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4 Error
3 Error
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
BCH parity generator vs ECB block area for a 45-bit multiplier
ECB block
Figure 4.7: Area comparison between BCH check-bit generator and error correction
block.
the BCH parity generation block against the error locator and correction block for a
45-bit multiplier. This shows that the area overhead increases as the error correction
capability t for a constant multiplier size. However the area overhead reduces for a
 xed number of required error correction with regard to increase in the multiplier size.
The area comparison of BCH vs. Hamming code implementation is shown in
Fig. 4.8. The area overhead of the dynamically error correctable multiplier schemes is
explored in Fig. 4.9. Though the percentage area overhead for the smaller designs is
large, for the larger multipliers, the area overhead is approximately 150%. The power
dissipation of the designs under consideration is shown in Fig. 4.10.
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Figure 4.10: Power dissipation of Hamming and BCH ECB blocks.
4.4 ASIC Prototyping, Custom Chip Implementation,
and Fault Analysis
The BCH based error correction scheme is modeled in VHDL. For simulation and
validation of the error correction technique, 16-bit and 45-bit parallel PB multipliers as
design examples have been considered. Since the error correction logic is independent
of the multiplier logic, this scheme can be extended for bit parallel multipliers of any
size or to any digital circuit in general.
4.4.1 Physical Design in 180nm CMOS Technology
For the purpose of design implementation in silicon the design was synthesized using
the SynopsysTM design compiler in the 180 nm technology. The back-end process,
place and route, was done for a 45-bit GF multiplier with three error correction capa-
bilities using the Cadence EncounterTM tool set. For the completeness of the ASIC
design !ow, the  nal layout of the design is given as shown in Fig. 4.11. The device
complexity of the design can be seen from this layout.
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Figure 4.11: A 180 nm CMOS based physical design of the proposed 45-bit GF mul-
tiplier with multiple error correction capability.
4.4.2 Fault Coverage Analysis
To investigate the reliability of the proposed scheme, a behavioral fault analysis has
been conducted. The C++ behavior model of the 45-bit multiplier is made and in-
jected with multiple errors randomly for 500 times. Cases such as no error, single bit
error, 2-bit errors and so on up to 9-bit errors, with various bit error correction capa-
bilities are considered for the analysis. Fig. 4.12(a) shows the 1-bit, 3-bit, 4-bit and
5-bit error correcting designs up to 9 random faults. The green lines indicate the error
coverage by existing single bit correctable designs. The areas under the other lines in
Fig. 4.12(b) and Fig. 4.12(c), Fig. 4.12(d) show the number of faulty cases for each
design with a certain number of error correction capabilities (3 to 5-bit). The analysis
clearly shows that the proposed 3- to 5-bit error correcting designs cover more random
faults with slightly higher area overhead compared to existing single error correcting
designs. The literature review suggests that, this is the  rst presentation of multiple
bit error correction in functional blocks due to permanent and induced faults where as
all other existing approaches considered only either double error detection or single
error correction. In general for a t error correcting design, it can be shown that out of
∑m−1j=0
(
n
j
)
total error combinations a total of ∑ti=0
(
n
i
)
errors will be corrected.
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Figure 4.12: Analysis of the fault coverage of the proposed fault tolerant architecture:
(a) Fault coverage for 1 bit error with LDPC or Hamming; (b) Fault coverage for 3 bit
errors; (c) Fault coverage for 4 bit errors; (d) Fault coverage for 5 bit errors.
4.5 Summary
This chapter presented a novel technique and architecture for designing fault and attack
tolerant systems over  nite  elds based on the BCH codes. The designs were tested
with  nite  eld multipliers, which can be the target of malicious attacks owing to their
importance in cryptographic hardware. This chapter also presented an optimized bit
parallel implementation of the iterative Chien search algorithm for  nding the roots of
the error locator polynomials in the BCH error correction blocks. The designs were
further improved with a dynamically error correcting architecture, for reducing the
critical path delay penalty by up to 50% in the absence of any errors. This contributed
to signi cant performance enhancement in the absence of any errors. The proposed
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scheme can also tackle errors occurring both in the functional block as well as in the
redundant bit generation blocks. Further, the designs were also compared with other
existing error correcting schemes present in literature. ASIC prototyping and silicon
implementation of the proposed architectures were done in 180 nm and 90 nm CMOS
technology. The experimental results show that the proposed scheme has a lower com-
plexity in terms of area, delay and power compared with the TMR based techniques and
better error correction capability as compared to other existing well known techniques
such as Hamming and LDPC, with comparable area overheads, e.g., the area complex-
ity for 3-bit correction in a 45-bit multiplier is only 150% as compared to 200% of that
of TMR. Also, compared to 130% hardware overhead of the existing SEC techniques,
the hardware overhead of the proposed technique is well within acceptable margins
especially with its enhanced capability. As the error correcting blocks are independent
of the multiplier functional block, these designs could be easily extended to address
error corrections in other multiplier structures such as a digit serial multiplier.
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Chapter 5
Low Complexity Cross Parity Codes
for Multiple Error Correction in GF
Multiplier Structures
5.1 Introduction
On-line error detection and correction has been researched as an effective method of
mitigating errors in digital integrated circuits [72]. Occurrence of errors in a logic
block have become a major concern with the rapid proliferation of smaller feature
sizes in hardware fabrication technology. Furthermore, radiation based on-line fault
attacks in cryptographic-hardware is a real threat to security infrastructures [36]. The
main challenge in designing a fault tolerant scheme to mitigate both natural and inten-
tional faults that results in multiple bit error is optimizing the additional area overhead
of the error mitigating circuitry and hence the power consumption and related delay. In
applications like low power cryptography, where dedicated crypto-processors are em-
bedded inside a smart card or RFID, the electronic hardware has to be very compact
and area optimized to keep its power consumption and delay to a minimum acceptable
level. However, it is a challenging task to make such critical application circuits fault
tolerant by keeping constraints such as area and power low.
This chapter presents a novel multiple error correction technique, where the errors
can occur due to radiation induced transients or from manufacturing defects, based on
the cross parity scheme. The idea of introducing such a viable scheme is to provide
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a better trade off between area overhead and the fault tolerance capability. The key
idea is to detect and correct as many errors as possible with less area overhead and
less errors escaping. Lesser area also gives lesser power consumption, which could
be suitable for low power applications such as RFID, sensor network applications, and
smart cards.
5.2 The Proposed Cross Parity Code
The classical approach for multiple bit error detection and correction in digital arith-
metic circuits is to use the well known forward error correcting codes. The forward
error correcting codes are generally meant to correct erroneous data in communication
related applications, often known as burst error correction. Hence, the main challenge
of applying these methods directly for fault tolerant circuit design is often complex
and tricky. This is because of the complexity associated with decoding the error in-
formation in order to perform the correction. The decoding circuitry always consumes
comparatively higher area overhead though they give potential freedom in correcting
 xed multiple bit errors [10]. In critical applications where area overhead is a major
concern, fault tolerant circuits with a trade off between the number of corrected errors
and the area overhead is highly desirable. Such applications include, low end cryptog-
raphy processors (used in RFID smart cards for example) and sensor networks. In this
section, a novel methodology for multiple bit error correction in logic circuits, which
relies only on the error detection features of the well known BCH codes cross coupled
with simple output parity prediction, is proposed. This is done to save the area com-
plexity contribution from the decoding circuitry of these classical codes. By doing so
one can easily achieve a trade off between the area overhead and fault tolerance sim-
ply by avoiding the complex hardware implementations of the decoders for the error
correction codes. The proposed method is evaluated based on two major test bench
multiplier architectures  rstly, with bit parallel multipliers over binary extension  elds
incorporated in various crypto-cores, and later with a FIPS/NIST standard 163-bit digit
serial/word level multiplier typically used in the Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
hardware [73; 74]. The basic block diagram of the cross parity based scheme is as
shown in Fig. 5.1. The major blocks are the functional block that need to be transient
76
5.2 The Proposed Cross Parity Code
error tolerant, cross parity predictor to detect the occurrence of errors, and a simple
error correction block.
B
Functional"Block
Cross"Code"Parity"
Predictor
Correction"Block
m m m m
m q
m
A
Figure 5.1: General block diagram of cross parity based error correction architecture.
Figure 5.2: Organization of functional block output in cross parity based error correc-
tion technique.
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5.2.1 Multiple Error Detection
The organization of the output bits of the functional block in the proposed cross parity
technique is shown in Fig. 5.2 for a 20-bit circuit. Here, the output bits of a circuit can
be grouped either in a uniform or in a completely random manner. Each row of the
grouped output bits can be encoded with any multiple error correcting codes, depend-
ing upon the number of error corrections needed. In this chapter, the BCH encoding
technique has been incorporated for encoding the rows, as the experimental results
have demonstrated that this encoding scheme has a wide range of error detection ca-
pabilities compared to other codes. However, the columns are encoded using a simple
output parity scheme. For the purpose of illustration, each row is encoded with BCH
codes that have minimum Hamming distance (dmin) of 7. The procedure is explained
with an example circuit constituting a 20-bit parallel  nite  eld multiplier in the fol-
lowing section.
5.2.2 Error Detection Using BCH Code Parity
The basic principle and design of the bit-parallel BCH(n,k,dmin) code based multiple
error detection is explained with a 20-bit multiplier arranged as shown in Fig. 5.2.
Let us consider a simple case of BCH(15,5,7), where n = 15 and k = 5. In this
fairly small example, a bit parallel Polynomial Basis (PB) multiplier over GF(25) is
considered. The  rst row of the bits is encoded using BCH codes as shown in Eq. (5.1)
and Eq. (5.2). In this case, as n = 15 and k = 5, the following expression is obtained:
M(x) = c4x
4+ c3x
3+ c2x
2+ c1x+ c0. (5.1)
xn−kM(x) = xn−k(c4x
4+ c3x
3+ c2x
2+ c1x+ c0)
= c4x
14+ c3x
13+ c2x
12+ c1x
11+ c0x
10. (5.2)
where, n− k = 10, and M(x) refers to the  rst group of bits of the 20-bit multiplier
circuit (Example bits of Row 1 of Fig. 5.2) and Xn−k is the n− k bit shifted version of
M(x).
The parity check bits are generated as follows:
P(x) = xn−kM(x) mod g(x). (5.3)
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Let us consider the generator polynomial of M(x) to be g(x) = x10 + x8 + x5 + x4 +
x2 + x+1. Then the parity expression for the  rst row for a 6 bit error detection is of
the following form:
P(x) = p9x
9+ p8x
8+ p7x
7+ p6x
6+ p5x
5+ p4x
4+ p3x
3
+p2x
2+ p1x
1+ p0. (5.4)
Let us consider a 3-bit correcting BCH code. Hence it can detect 6 bit errors in a
single code word. So to detect multiple errors in a 5-bit code, a total of ten parity bits
are needed. They are as follows:
p0 = c0+ c2+ c4, p0 = d0+d2+d4+ e0+ e1+ e2+ e3, p1 = c0+ c1+ c2+ c3+ c4
p1 = d0+d1+d2+d3+d4, p2 = c0+ c1+ c3
p2 = d0+d1+d3+ e1+ e2+ e3, p3 = c1+ c2+ c4
p3 = d1+d2+d4+ e0+ e2+ e3
p4 = c0+ c3+ c4
p4 = d0+d3+d4+ e0+ e2
p5 = c0+ c1+ c2
p5 = d0+d1+d2+ e2
p6 = c1+ c2+ c3
p6 = d1+d2+d3+ e0+ e3
p7 = c2+ c3+ c4
p7 = d2+d3+d4+ e1
p8 = c0+ c2+ c3
p8 = d0+d2+d3+ e0+ e1+ e3
p9 = c1+ c3+ c4
p9 = d0+d3+d4+ e0+ e2.
Here, the ′d′s and ′e′s are the inner products of the multiplier [29]. In a similar way
all the rows can be encoded using the Hamming codes [37]. However, the BCH codes
have better error detection coverage than the Hamming codes and hence in this design
example, only the BCH encoding based scheme is considered. The columns are en-
coded using the simple parity scheme as this enables us to locate an error in a row,
while keeping the hardware complexity low. Every two bits are protected by a col-
umn parity CP as shown in Fig. 5.2. The column parities of the  rst two columns of
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example marked in gray (Fig. 5.3) are determined as shown in the following:
CP0 = c0⊕ c10 (5.5)
CP1 = c5⊕ c15 (5.6)
CP2 = c1⊕ c11 (5.7)
CP3 = c6⊕ c16. (5.8)
The rest of the column parities, CP4 to CP9, are generated exactly the same way as
CP0 to CP3 are generated.
The set of BCH row parities that is used to encode the row helps to determine the
occurrence of the multiple errors in each row. Similarly, Eq. (5.5) to Eq. (5.8) com-
puted for each column also predict the particular bit that is in error using the properties
of cross parity. The row error information together with the column error information
coupled with a simple AND-XOR decoder helps to correct the erroneous bits. Some
of the error patterns that the proposed technique can correct for the 20-bit example are
given in Fig. 5.3.
Figure 5.3: Example patterns for BCH based cross parity code based correction for a
20-bit multiplier.
An example pattern of a BCH code based cross parity code for 64 bit multiplier is
shown in Fig. 5.4. As in the previous example, a 6-bit error detectable BCH encoder
80
5.3 The Proposed Decoding Algorithm
is considered for each row. In each column the simple parity codes for column error
information is used for column encoding. Hence this architecture can detect 2-bit
errors in each column and 6 bit errors in each row. This implies that it can correct
up to certain 12 bit errors for the 64-bit example. Some of the example patterns are
highlighted in color in Fig. 5.4. Similar color patterns indicate a single group having
multiple errors.
Figure 5.4: Example patterns for BCH based cross parity code based correction for a
64-bit multiplier.
5.3 The Proposed Decoding Algorithm
In this section, a novel reduced complexity decoding algorithm is proposed for multiple
error correction. The complexity of classical decoders has been bypassed by using the
fairly simple cross parity codes. The decoding circuitry presented in this section uses
a simple AND-XOR logic to perform the correction. For example, let us consider the
pattern in the top left of Fig. 5.3 shaded in grey indicating that bits c0, c1, c5 and c6
are in error. Any error in bits c0 and c1 are detected using the BCH encoding of row 1
and similarly the errors in c5 and c6 are detected by BCH encoding of row 2. But
this detection only shows the error occurrence but not the location. The locations of
the erroneous bits in each row can be determined using the column parties as bit c0
is protected by CP0, and bit c5 is protected by CP1. Similarly, the bits c1 and c6 are
protected by CP2 and CP3 respectively. By using the combination of both row and
column parities, it is possible to locate the bits in error. A detailed diagram of the
cross parity code decoder is shown in Fig. 5.5. The RP and CP inputs represent the
row and column parities and the multiplier output is represented with C in the internal
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architecture of the decoder. The error correction block of the multiplier circuit is shown
in Fig. 5.6.
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Figure 5.5: Detailed block diagram of the cross parity decoder.
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Figure 5.6: Internal details of the correction logic.
The proposed decoding scheme is presented in Algorithm 1. The steps used to gen-
erate the bit streams considered in the  nal error correction is presented in Algorithm 2.
The algorithm uses the following notations: A(x), B(x) are the multiplier inputs and
C(x) is the multiplier functional block output. P(x) is the primitive polynomial of the
 eld. Let Er[i] and Ec[ j], for 0≤ i < r and 0≤ j < t, be arrays of u≥ 1 and v≥ 1 bits
for storing the row and column encoded bits respectively, and TE represent the output
of the cross parity decoder that has the correction information, and Ccorrect be the  nal
correct output.
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Algorithm 1 Proposed decoding steps for cross parity code.
1: Input : A(x), B(x),C(x), P(x) ∈ GF(2m).
2: Output : Ccorrect(x).
3: for i = 0 to r−1 do
4: ER[i] = BCH encoding of row i;
5: end for
6: for j = 0 to t−1 do
7: EC[ j] = Simple parity of column j.
8: end for
9: TE = Call Algorithm 2;
10: Ccorrect =C⊕TE;
11: returnCcorrect;
Algorithm 2 Proposed steps to generate the bit streams.
1: Inputs ER[i],0≤ i < r, EC[ j],0≤ j < t, C(x) ∈ GF(2
m)
2: Output TE.
3: Variables tr : r-bit Array, tc : t-bit array;
4: Initialize tr and tc to all 0s;
5: for i = 0 to r−1 do
6: tr[i] = Logical OR of the syndrome bits in ER[i].
7: end for
8: for j = 0 to t−1 do
9: tc[ j] = Logical OR of the syndrome bits in EC[ j].
10: end for
11: TE = Call Algorithm 3 with tr, tc,TE;
12: return TE.
Algorithm 3, required by Algorithm 2, uses simple bit-wise AND operations on
the corresponding bits in tc and tr, as determined by the for-loops, to locate the bits in
error in C and produces TE. This information is used to correct any error in the  nal
output, as shown in Algorithm 1.
Most of the algorithms are self explanatory, and hence the details are left out for
brevity.
A simple AND-XOR logic is used to correct the detected errors. Some of the
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Algorithm 3 Error location.
1: Parameters tr, tc,TE;
2: Variables i, p,q : integers;
3: Output TE;
4: for i = 0 to m
2
−1 do
5: for p = 0 to m
2k
−1 do
6: for q = 0 to m
2
−1 do
7: TE[i] = tr[p] AND tc[q];
8: q = q+2;
9: end for
10: p = p+1;
11: end for
12: i = i+1;
13: end for
14: for i = m
2
to m−1 do
15: for p = m
2k
to m
k
−1 do
16: for q = 1 to m
2
−1 do
17: TE[i] = tr[p] AND tc[q];
18: q = q+2;
19: end for
20: p = p+1;
21: end for
22: i = i+1;
23: end for
24: return TE;
example patterns of the erroneous bits to be corrected using the cross codes are shown
in Fig. 5.3 and Fig. 5.4. A set of erroneous bits are denoted by the same color. Example
patterns of errors in a 64-bit  nite  eld multiplier over GF(26) with BCH encoding in
each row is shown in Fig. 5.4. In this case, with a BCH(31,16) code, one can detect up
to 6 errors per row thereby increasing the number of bits being corrected, as compared
to the simple Hamming codes.
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5.4 Performance Bounds of the Proposed Scheme
In this section the performance bounds of the proposed technique is presented. For any
n, k, and dmin, the following parameters applies:
Number of detected errors = dmin−1, (5.9)
Number of corrected errors =
dmin−1
2
. (5.10)
where, dmin is the Hamming distance between code words. For a Hamming distance
dmin, the total number of code words possible are 2
n−1. Among these code words, there
are 2k−1 codes, which will be detected but another 2k−1 codes will escape detection.
This is due to the fact that, some erroneous code words may have the same property as
that of a valid code word.
5.4.1 Theoretical Bounds
This section presents the mathematical treatment and closed form expressions for the
proposed technique. First, a closed form expressions for the total number of error
patterns the proposed technique can correct is derived, out of all the possible error
patterns, and then using this the theoretical bounds on its error correction capability is
also formulated.
Without loss of generality, let us assume that the bits are ordered from right to left,
with the MSB being the left most bit. Let m, where m is an even number, represent the
total number of bits under consideration1. The m input bits are grouped into a number
of k-bit chunks for k ∈ {y|(1≤ y≤ m
2
) and (m mod 2 · y = 0)}. For 1≤ i≤ m
2k
, let Pi
represent a pair of k-bit groups under the same parity check circuitry.
Assuming an error detection capability of d = dmin− 1 (1 ≤ d ≤ k) bit errors per
group, the total number of bit errors which the proposed technique can correct is ≤ d ·
m
2k
. The best case bound occurs with d = k, in which case the number of bits corrected
is ≤ k · m
2k
, i.e. ≤ m
2
. However, this is subject to the condition that, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m
2k
,
at most one of the k-bit groups in each pair Pi is in error. Hence, a better picture
of the error correction capability maybe obtained by considering the total number of
1If m is an odd number, then m can be expressed as the sum of a suitable even number and another
odd number.
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error combinations the proposed technique can correct out of all the possible error
combinations.
For the analysis, the presence of 1 in a bit position implies that the corresponding
bit is in error. Hence, there are 2m−1 possible error combinations. Assuming that the
group pairs are adjacent, with P1 being the right most one, let Di be the total number
of correctable error combinations up to Pi. Here, if both of the groups in Pi are in
error, then Pi is undetectable, and hence the whole input pattern is uncorrectable. This
is explained in the following lemmas.
Lemma 1 Considering a single group pair independently and detection capability of
1≤ d ≤ k bit errors in any combination within a group, the total number of corrected
fault combinations in any single group pair is
D1 = 2 ·
d
∑
j=1
(
k
j
)
.1 (5.11)
Proof. Let us consider the k-bit group pair as shown below:
k
︷ ︸︸ ︷
bk−1 · · ·b2b1b0
k
︷ ︸︸ ︷
ak−1 · · ·a2a1a0 .
Clearly the total number of correctable faults in either group is ∑dj=1
(
k
j
)
. Now, this
group pair is correctable if one of the groups is in error at a time. Hence, the total num-
ber of correctable faults in this group pair is, D1 = ∑
d
j=1
(
k
j
)
+∑dj=1
(
k
j
)
= 2 ·∑dj=1
(
k
j
)
.
[Q.E.D.]
In general, the number of corrected error combinations up to the pair of groups Pi
is given by the following.
Theorem 1 The total number of corrected fault combinations, with 1≤ d ≤ k bit error
detection capability per group, up to Pi for 1≤ i≤
m
2k
is
Di = (2 ·
d
∑
j=1
(
k
j
)
+1)i−1. (5.12)
1
(
n
r
)
denotes the number of ways of choosing r objects from n objects for 0≤ r ≤ n.
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Proof. The proof is done by induction on Di and i≥ 1.
Base Case: Substituting i = 1 in Eq. (5.12) yields D1 = 2 ·∑
d
j=1
(
k
j
)
+ 1− 1 =
2 ·∑dj=1
(
k
j
)
, which proves the base case by Lemma 1.
Induction Hypothesis: The theorem holds for Dr and 1≤ r <
m
2k
.
Induction Step: This show that the theorem holds for Dr+1. Let us consider the set
of correctable bit combinations up to Pr: SUr = {a1,a2, . . . ,av}, where v = |SUr|
1 =
(2 ·∑dj=1
(
k
j
)
+1)r−1, by the hypothesis. Now the set of correctable bit combinations
for Pr+1 is Sr+1 = {b1,b2, . . . ,bw}, where w = |Sr+1| = 2 ·∑
d
j=1
(
k
j
)
, by Lemma 1. To
obtain the set of correctable combinations up to Pr+1, i.e. SUr+1,  rstly let us con-
struct two sets: S′r+1 = {Z2k}∪Sr+1 = {Z2k,b1,b2, . . . ,bw}, and SU
′
r = {Z2rk}∪SUr =
{Z2rk,a1,a2, . . . ,av}, where Z2k and Z2rk are all-2k and all-2rk zero combinations re-
spectively. The elements Z2k and Z2rk are added for covering all the correctable combi-
nations up to Pr+1. Then one obtain the set SU
′
r+1 by performing a Cartesian product
of S′r+1 and SU
′
r, i.e.
SU ′r+1 = {XY |X ∈ S
′
r+1 and Y ∈ SU
′
r}
= {Z2kZ2rk,Z2ka1, . . . ,bwav}.
which has
|SU ′r+1| = |S
′
r+1| · |SU
′
r|
= (2 ·
d
∑
j=1
(
k
j
)
+1) · (2 ·
d
∑
j=1
(
k
j
)
+1)r
= (2 ·
d
∑
j=1
(
k
j
)
+1)r+1.
elements. Clearly, the set SU ′r+1 contains all the correctable combinations up to Pr+1,
however, the combination Z2kZ2rk ∈ SU
′
r+1 does not represent any error condition.
Therefore, the set of actual correctable combinations up to Pr+1, SUr+1 = SU
′
r+1−
{Z2kZ2rk}. This implies that |SUr+1| = (2 ·∑
d
j=1
(
k
j
)
+ 1)r+1− 1 = Dr+1. Hence the
proof follows. [Q.E.D.]
1The notation |S| denotes the number of elements in the set S.
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Corollary If all the k erroneous bits per group are detectable for errors, i.e. d = k,
then we have
D1 = 2
k+1−2 (5.13)
and
Di = (2
k+1−1)i−1 (5.14)
Proof. Follows from Eq. (5.11) and Eq. (5.12) by substituting d = k, and simplifying
and noting that ∑kj=0
(
k
j
)
= 2k. [Q.E.D.]
Theorem 2 Given an m input circuit and k bit grouping and an error detection capa-
bility of 1≤ d ≤ k bit errors per group,
• The total number of correctable fault combinations,
Dw = (2 ·
d
∑
j=1
(
k
j
)
+1)w−1. (5.15)
where w = m
2k
.
• The total number of uncorrectable fault combinations,
Uw = 2
m− (2 ·
d
∑
j=1
(
k
j
)
+1)w−2. (5.16)
Proof. Follows trivially from Theorem 1 and the fact that the total number of possible
faults is 2m−1. [Q.E.D.]
The following theorem gives the theoretical bounds of the proposed cross parity
scheme.
Theorem 3 (Theoretical Bounds) Given an m input circuit, for all permissible values
of k, d, and w, the error correction capability of the proposed technique is bounded by
m≤ Dw ≤ 3
m
2 −1, i.e.,
• the lower bound on the number of errors corrected, Dmin = m, and,
• the upper bound on the number of errors corrected, Dmax = 3
m
2 −1.
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Proof. The lower bound is dictated by the minimum value of Dw in Eq. (5.15). For
Dw to be minimum, w and d need to be minimum. The minimum permissible value of
w is 1 and that of d is also 1. This implies that k = m
2
. Substituting these in Eq. (5.15)
gives us Dmin = D1 = 2 ·
((m2 )
1
)
= m.
The upper bound is dictated by the maximum value of Dwin Eq. (5.15). Dw is
maximum when w is maximum. The maximum permissible value of w is m
2
. This
implies that k = 1, and also d = 1. Substituting these in Eq. (5.15) gives us Dmax =
Dm
2
= (2 ·1+1)
m
2 −1= 3
m
2 −1.
Hence the proof follows. [Q.E.D.]
The theoretical formulations were coded in C++ and tested with all the permissible
values of k and d for various input sizes. Table 5.1 shows the trend of the number of
corrected error combinations for a typical 16-bit circuit for all permissible values of k
and d. The theoretical upper and lower bounds appear in the top and the bottom rows
respectively. In addition, this was veri ed with a simulation program, also developed
in C++, for generating all the possible error conditions, given m number of bits, and
determining how many of those error conditions were corrected based on the behavior
of the proposed technique for different permissible values of d and k.
Table 5.1 clearly shows that as d approaches k, the variations in the total number
of corrected errors reduces, which is to be expected. Another interesting case arises
with d = k = m
2
. This implies that w = 1. Substituting this in Eq. (5.15) gives us,
D1 = 2 ·∑
m
2
j=1
((m2 )
j
)
= 2
m
2 +1−2.
In this section, theoretically the capabilities of the proposed technique is analyzed.
In this regard, the theoretical upper bound merely shows the maximum number of
errors the technique can correct, out of 2m−1 possible error combinations. This limit
can be reached with k = d = 1, which implies that the inputs are aligned into a single
column, where each bit is tested for errors separately. In practice, this will depend on
the amount of extra hardware overhead that is desired in the application. Also, the error
detection capability per group d, for 1≤ d≤ k, will depend on the encoding techniques,
and not all values of d maybe practically feasible for a given m. As Table 5.1 indicates,
for a given m the optimum point is calculated in terms of the total errors corrected
by selecting a proper encoding algorithm that satis es the required value of d. In this
regard, performance analysis of the proposed technique under more practical settings
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Table 5.1: Number of corrected errors for a 16-bit circuit.
Bits per Detection Total detected
group, k capability, d errors, Dw
8 1 16
8 2 72
8 3 184
8 4 324
8 5 436
8 6 492
8 7 508
8 8 510
4 1 80
4 2 440
4 3 840
4 4 960
2 1 624
2 2 2400
1 1 6560
is presented in Section 5.6. The results indicate that the proposed scheme, albeit its
simplicity, can correct far more errors than well established coding algorithms with
acceptable hardware overheads.
5.5 Cross Codes Over Digit Serial Multipliers
In this section the proposed cross parity scheme is applied to more practical multipliers
such as very large scale word level or digit serial multipliers over binary extension
 elds. As a practical test bench design, a FIPS/NIST standard 163-bit digit serial
multiplier suitable for secure ECC operations [73; 74] has been considered.
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5.5.1 Organizing Bits in a 163-bit Multiplier
Till this section, all design example test circuits that were considered had an even
number of output bits. When the number of bits are odd, the can be organized in two
different ways:
1. Zeroes are added to the MSB of the circuit to make them even number of bits, or
2. They are split into a sum of even and odd bits and treat them separately.
In this section, the digit serial 163-bit multiplier is treated using the second ap-
proach. The circuit bits are split into two groups. The  rst group is with 160 bits (bits
0-159) and the second group is with 3 bits. The cross parity code scheme is then ap-
plied to both the groups separately. The  rst group is made fault tolerant in the same
way as explained in the bit parallel circuit design example. In case of the rest 3 bits,
split Hamming codes on the rows and simple parity on the columns are applied so that
any error in these 3 bits (bits 160-162) are detected and corrected. Hamming codes are
used on these 3 bits to keep the area overhead low.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the  rst time such a large scale multiplier has
been made multiple errors correctable based on coding techniques. The reason seems
to be that, most of the existing error correction techniques are suitable for either sin-
gle bit error correction or designed with only bit parallel implementations in mind and
hence are not suitable for large digit serial implementations. In addition, the chip area,
delay, and power requirement of bit parallel implementations of a 163-bit multiplier
over extension  elds is simply too high under current technology to be of any practical
use. This is further complicated by the fact that the error detection, decoding, and cor-
rection blocks of the existing techniques are all designed with parallel combinational
logic, which takes up a signi cant amount of chip area, thus further adding to the over-
head. These blocks are also placed on chip to run in parallel with the functional blocks
for concurrent error detection/correction, thereby incurring signi cant power drains.
Unlike these approaches, the proposed design scheme is suitable for both bit parallel
and digit serial implementations, where appropriate.
In this section an attempt is made to evaluate the complexity of the proposed
scheme over a large scale digit serial multiplier architecture to better understand the
91
5.6 Experimental Results
overall space complexity. The error correction architecture used in the digit serial mul-
tiplier is the same as that in bit-parallel designs despite the fact the bits are divided
into 2 groups and treated separately. It is possible to have a direct mapping of designs
between bit-parallel and digit serial structures due to the low complexity decoding
of the proposed architecture. The digit serial multiplication is designed using a sin-
gle accumulator multiplier architecture. The multiplication algorithm is as shown in
Algorithm 4 [23]. The results of this implementation, along with performance charac-
teristics, appear in Section 5.6.
Algorithm 4 The steps for multiplication [23].
1: Input : A(x) = ∑m−1i=0 ai · x
i, B(x) = ∑m−1i=0 bi · x
i, P(x);
2: Output : C(x) = A(x) ·B(x) mod P(x);
3: C = 0;
4: for i = 0 to (⌈m/D⌉−1) do
5: C = Bi ·A+C;
6: A = A ·αD;
7: end for
8: returnC mod P(x);
5.6 Experimental Results
In Section 5.4 the closed form formula for determining the exact number of error pat-
terns the proposed technique can correct, out of all the possible error conditions is
derived. This section also derives the theoretical bounds on the number of corrected
errors. This section further investigates the performance of this technique in terms of
more practical settings. The performance analysis is carried out based on:
• functional veri cation associated with ASIC prototyping;
• hardware performance analysis in terms of area overhead, total required area,
power consumptions, and overall delaysthis was done based on available tar-
get technology;
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• comparison of hardware area, power, and delay with existing error correction
hardware;
• recoverability analysis in terms of various numbers of randomly injected faults
for a 163-bit FIPS/NIST multiplier, which was compared with other coding tech-
niques.
As a case study of the design complexities and performance of the proposed tech-
nique, both bit parallel and digit serial multipliers of various complexities over the
binary extension  elds have been subjected to multiple fault tolerance. In particular,
for a realistic measure of the performance, a 163-bit digit serial multiplier, which is
considered to be the standard for Public Key Cryptography (PKC) set by NIST and
FIPS is also made fault tolerant with the proposed technique.
5.6.1 Functional Simulation and ASIC Prototyping
The proposed technique has been applied to bit parallel multipliers over binary exten-
sion  elds to make them fault tolerant. The designs are implemented in VHDL and
simulated for functional correctness using ModelsimTM. The design is then synthe-
sized using the SynopsysTM design compilers. Both 180nm and 90nm technologies
are used for gathering realistic and up to date performance of the circuits. The  nal
synthesized netlist is used for constructing the physical layout with the help of the SoC
EncounterTM tool from CadenceTM.
For comparison purposes and gaining a better understanding of the area overhead
complexity of the proposed scheme, various multiplier designs are encoded row wise
using both Hamming and BCH code based encoding. The area complexities of the
various multiplier sizes, the Hamming code based cross parity scheme, and BCH en-
coded scheme are given in Fig. 5.7. Fig. 5.8 shows the area overhead comparison of
the error detection and correction blocks of the cross parity code architecture of both
Hamming and BCH based designs. It is evident from the bar chart that the area over-
head is comparable. This is due to the fact that BCH and Hamming encoders required
the same number of parity bits when they are used in cross parity code arrangements.
However, the more effective the error detection code is for the row coverage, the better
is the overall error pattern and error correction coverage achieved.
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Figure 5.7: Area of various multiplier sizes.
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Figure 5.8: Comparison of error detection and correction block areas of Hamming vs
BCH cross parity code in 90nm technology.
Table 5.2: Comparison of the proposed scheme with other approaches for 32-bit mul-
tiplier.
Property [29] [69] [10] Cross Par. (Ham) Cross Par. (BCH)
#Errors single single 3 Errors up to 6 Errors up to 12 Errors
Technique Hamming LDPC Classic BCH Hamm. + Simple Parity BCH + Simple Parity
Overhead >100% >100% 150.4% 108% 120%
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Table 5.2 compares the proposed cross parity code approach with other error cor-
rection schemes available in open literature. For a fair comparison, 32-bit multipliers
over the binary extension  elds are considered. It is clear from Table 5.2 that the
proposed method can correct a greater number of errors with lesser area overhead as
compared to the other well established schemes.
The area overhead of the proposed cross parity based method is depicted in Ta-
ble 5.3. It is observed for the experimental analysis that the area overhead for both
BCH and Hamming based cross parity schemes are very close. This is due to the
fact that, only the error detection part of the BCH codes is used. The area overhead
for a very simple 10-bit multiplier is only 142%. As the multiplier size grows, the
percentage area overhead due to the parity generation circuit and the correction logic
grow more slowly. For example, in contrast, the area overhead of a 80-bit multiplier
with multiple error correction capability is just 101%. This is noticeably smaller as
compared to the classic multiple error correction schemes based on only single error
correction capability. Even though the design is not correcting all the possible error
patterns, the likely hood of many error patterns occurring is extremely low. This is
because of the standard industrial assumption that the probability of radiation particle
interference resulting in multiple bit !ips can be as low as one in one million clock
cycles. Hence the proposed scheme can provide excellent error masking capability
with area overheads as low as 106% for an 80-bit bit parallel multiplier with BCH row
encoding.
Table 5.3: Area overhead comparison of various multiplier sizes.
No. of bits Hamming BCH
10 142% 160%
15 123% 152%
20 121% 140%
32 108% 120%
48 105% 116%
64 104% 114%
90 101% 106%
The power dissipation of the proposed scheme has been analyzed. Fig. 5.9 com-
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pares the power consumptions of both Hamming and BCH encoding based designs in
90nm technology. As in the case of area, the power pro les of both Hamming and
BCH based schemes are very much comparable. The analysis is done on both 90nm
and 180nm TSMCTM technology libraries. For simplicity, the area and power compar-
ison is mainly done in 90nm technology. As they have comparable area overhead, the
power dissipation is roughly close to each other as well.
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Figure 5.9: Comparison of power consumption of Hamming vs BCH cross parity code
in 90nm technology.
5.6.2 Experimental Analysis of a 163-bit Digit Serial Multiplier
It is known that the bit parallel multipliers are mainly used in applications requiring
very high performance. For more complex computations, the classic bit parallel mul-
tipliers cannot be used as the area complexity simply explodes as the multiplier size
increases. Hence the digit serial multipliers as used as a trade off between the area
complexity and performance. Therefore, the proposed scheme has been veri ed over a
more realistic and practically applicable 163-bit digit serial multiplier. The area over-
head of the 163-bit digit serial multiplier, with both Hamming and BCH encoded cross
parity error correction scheme, has been analyzed. Fig. 5.10 shows the bar chart of the
area overhead for the 163-bit multiplier for different digit sizes. The digit sizes of 2,
4, and 6 are considered. The overhead plot clearly indicates that the space overhead
signi cantly reduces for higher digit sizes of the digit serial multiplier.
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Figure 5.10: Area overhead of error detection and correction block for 163-bit digit
serial multiplier.
To complete the design !ow, the proposed architecture is implemented using RTL
synthesizable VHDL code. Also the design is synthesized with the 0.18µm technology
using the SynopsysTM design compiler tools. The back end process, place and route,
is carried using the Cadence EncounterTM tool set. The  nal layout of the 163-bit
multiplier design is shown in Fig. 5.11. The layout area, based on 6 metal layer, is
1.84mm2. The physical layout of the 163-bit digit serial multiplier design with the
Hamming encoded cross parity scheme using the Cadence SoC EncounterTM tool have
been generated. Fig. 5.11 shows the generated layout of the resulting design.
Fig. 5.12 shows the complexity of cross code parity predictor block of Fig. 5.2 for
various multiplier sizes for both Hamming and BCH encoding schemes.
5.6.3 Recoverability Analysis of the Proposed Design
Recovery analysis is vital in experimentally validating the performance of an error
correcting scheme. In order to validate the proposed technique, a behavioral model of
the error correcting circuit was constructed in C++. The circuit is then subjected to
fault injection based analysis. The fault simulation is mainly carried out in 3 parts. In
the  rst part, errors are randomly injected ranging from 1-bit error up to 13-bit errors
and the simulation is carried out for two million iterations. This is to validate the
performance of the circuit in standard case. In the second and third parts the errors are
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Figure 5.11: Layout of the 163-bit multiplier with cross parity code correction block.
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Figure 5.12: Number of required parity bits for various multiplier size in both Ham-
ming and BCH based schemes.
injected electively between the circuit output bits 079 and 80159 respectively. The
second and third validations are also carried out over two million iterations each.
Owing to the novel decoder design, together with the segmentation of the bit pat-
terns, and the fact that only the encoding features of the classical codes (e.g. BCH and
Hamming) are used, it is observed that the proposed technique can exceed the limit
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of dmin− 1 detected errors. This was also re!ected in the simulation results, which
showed up to 90% error detection with the proposed scheme.
Table 5.4 shows the comparison of the proposed scheme under random fault in-
jection with respect to other multiple error correction schemes. It is evident that most
of the classical approaches fail after 3-bit errors (when a code with dmin = 7 is used)
whereas the range of the proposed technique clearly extends up to 13-bit errors when
the errors appear randomly.
Table 5.4: Fault coverage comparison of proposed technique with other techniques.
No. of faults Hamming Split Hamming BCH Proposed
1 100% 100% 100% 100%
2 0% 48% 100% 90.2%
3 0% 0% 100% 73.5%
4 0% 0% 0% 54.3%
5 0% 0% 0% 41.1%
6 0% 0% 0% 33%
7 0% 0% 0% 26.43%
8 0% 0% 0% 10%
9 0% 0% 0% 7%
10 0% 0% 0% 5.1%
11 0% 0% 0% 4.3%
12 0% 0% 0% 2%
13 0% 0% 0% 1.8%
Table 5.5 shows the results of the proposed schemes correction capability when the
random faults are injection into either the group of bits 079 or 80159. The proposed
scheme outperforms all other classical error correcting schemes as its correction range
clearly extends up to 80-bit errors. An example plot that shows the error coverage range
appears in Fig. 5.13. For plotting simplicity, the plot depicts only up to 7 injected errors
though it can correct up to all the 80 bits in reality.
When simulated under the best performance bound, the circuit is iterated over two
million times with random bit errors, ranging from single bit error to 80-bit errors.
These errors are injected into either bits 079 or 80159 to study the probability of
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Table 5.5: Fault coverage comparison of the proposed technique with other techniques.
No. of faults Hamming Split Hamming BCH [Proposed]
1 100% 100% 100% 100%
2 0% 48% 100% 100%
3 0% 0% 100% 100%
4-33 0% 0% 0% 100%
34-79 0% 0% 0% 98%
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Figure 5.13: Range of the proposed scheme with injected errors in bits 0-79 or 80-159.
undetectable bit patterns occurring due to the theoretical performance bounds given in
Section 5.4. The experimental results, given in Fig. 5.14, demonstrates that only 1% of
the cases out of the two million random errors fell outside the correction capability of
the proposed scheme. This is a clear advantage of the proposed technique over other
multiple error correction techniques.
From a theoretical point of view, for the 160-bit part, assuming that any one or more
of the 160 bits can be in error simultaneously, i.e. with m = 160, k = 16, and d = 6,
the proposed technique is able to correct 2.34416× 1022 errors (from Theorem 2),
whereas a complete BCH algorithm, with e= d
2
= 3, can correct ∑ej=1
(
160
j
)
= 682,800
errors. Hence, for this speci c design the proposed technique can correct 2.34416×10
22
682,800 ≈
3.43×1016 times more errors out of all the possible 2160−1 error conditions compared
to the BCH technique in its entirety. To determine the complexity of the BCH scheme
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Figure 5.14: Undetected errors under best performance bound.
to match the correction capability of the proposed scheme, i.e. to be able to correct
2.34416×1022 error combinations for a 160-bit circuit, a C++ program is developed.
This is used to  nd out how many bits the BCH scheme would need correcting, given
m number of bits and q number of error conditions. A simple algorithm is used as
follows: For 1 ≤ r ≤ m to  nd the maximum value of r such that s = ∑rj=1
(
m
j
)
is
maximum and s≤ q. The result obtained form= 160 and q= 2.34416×1022 indicated
that the BCH scheme would require 17 bit correction capability, with a 2× 17 = 34
bit detection capability, i.e. the minimum required Hamming distance needs to be
34+1= 35. The hardware complexity of such a scheme for detecting errors in any bit
position simultaneously in a 160-bit circuit could be too high to be of any practical use.
Hence, perhaps it is fair to claim that the proposed technique is capable of correcting
signi cantly more errors, compared to well established multiple error correction codes
for comparable hardware overheads.
5.7 Summary
This chapter proposed a novel multiple error correction scheme based on cross parity
codes in order to address the temporal faults in circuits, mainly occurring due to radia-
tion interferences. The scheme provides with a high degree of multiple error correction
capability, with acceptable hardware overheads. With this technique the m outputs of
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a circuit are broken into k-bit groups and m
2k
group pairs. Each k-bit group is encoded
with classical encoding algorithms, e.g. BCH or Hamming, while the error detection,
location, and correction is done with simple parity per group pair, together with pair-
wise AND operations and bit !ips. This enabled us to bypass the area intensive error
detection, decoding, and correction blocks of the classical codes thus signi cantly re-
duce the area complexity of the extra hardware. The theoretical bounds of the scheme
are derived it has been shown that it can correct up to 3
m
2 − 1 combinations out of all
the possible error combinations, and correct up to m
2
bit errors per input. This is sig-
ni cantly superior to existing approaches with comparable hardware overhead. In this
regard, it was observed by making a 163-bit FIPS/NIST standard digit serial GF mul-
tiplier error tolerant, that to match the proposed error correction capability, the extra
hardware required by classical codes may not be feasible for most practical designs.
As benchmark test cases, 80-bit bit-parallel multipliers and a 163-bit digit serial
FIPS/NIST standard multiplier over GF are considered. The rational behind selecting
these circuits was that the multipliers are the most complex blocks in crypto-cores and
they occupy the largest area on the wafer. As such they are much more susceptible to
radiation particles, and hence to errors and transient attacks. The experimental results
suggested an overhead of 101% and 170% for the 80-bit parallel and the 163-bit digit
serial multiplier, with digit sizes of up to 6 bits and error correction capabilities in ex-
cess of 3-bit errors. This was found to be signi cantly better than existing approaches.
Owing to its high degree of error correction capability, the target applications in-
clude critical areas, e.g. for mitigating fault related attacks in crypto-hardware, in
radiation prone space and nuclear applications, and so on. The proposed technique can
also be an excellent candidate for most practical systems with a high degree of inter-
nal node fanout. In these systems, any single fault at an internal node with multiple
fanouts can manifest as multiple faults at the output. Clearly, single error correction
techniques and techniques with low error correction capabilities will be inadequate for
these applications.
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Chapter 6
GF Circuits Using Emerging
Technologies
6.1 Introduction
Cryptography is a unique area where one needs secure operation at faster computation
rates. In order to achieve faster computation and high integration, the device geometry
needs to be scaled down. The advancements in CMOS technology, driven my Moores
law, was a bene t to the crypto-hardware designers until its integrity and reliability
were questioned because of its susceptibility to transient and permanent faults. How-
ever, since the high integration is a much desired factor in digital ICs, its high reliability
should be ensured. According to the ITRS-2009 survey, it is evident that further scaling
in CMOS devices is limited by the adverse performance of the devices beyond 20nm
geometry. Since then, research has been conducted to  nd new technologies, device
structures and materials to overcome the limitations that CMOS technology possesses
for further scaling. According to the survey, the potential candidates for overcoming
the scaling limitation of CMOS are Carbon Nano Tube Field Effect Transistors (CNT-
FETs) and Quantum Cellular Automata (QCA) circuits. Although these schemes may
support dimensionality reduction, small feature size makes them more vulnerable to
the malicious, transient fault based attacks and other permanent faults such as stuck-at
faults. This is an unavoidable aspect in areas such as cryptography where high end
reliability and integrity should be paramount [6].
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As the scaling of devices in CNTFETs and QCAs goes beyond 20nm or less, they
become more and more susceptible to faults and transient attacks. These faults, either
natural or malicious, can result in multiple bit errors at the output of the functional
blocks. In either case, the end result may be catastrophic. Hence the circuits realised
using emerging technologies may also be subjected to malicious attacks as explained
in previous chapters of this thesis.
Thus it is evident that error tolerant schemes are inevitable even in future technolo-
gies. As cryptography and dedicated crypto-hardware is an inevitable part of modern
digital VLSI circuits, crypto-devices using emerging technologies should also be re-
searched for feasible fault tolerant methods to ensure their reliability [17]. This chapter
thus investigates the performance  gures such as power and delay of multiple error de-
tecting schemes over bit parallel Normal Basis (NB) GF multiplier implemented using
emerging technologies such as CNTFET and QCA.
6.2 Effects of Faults on Reliability of Galois Field Cir-
cuits
The effect of faults and their impact on the  nite  eld circuits are investigated in this
section. Normal Basis multipliers over binary extension  eld are considered as test
bench circuits for the case study. The classical bit parallel NB multiplier structures can
be considered as AND-XOR logic structure divided into two main parts. The  rst part
generates them2 product terms realised with AND gates and second stage produces the
multiplication result by performing XOR operations over the product terms. The  nal
result generally has m2 AND gates and (m2−1) XOR gates with product terms shared
between m outputs. Sharing of the AND gates depends on the primitive polynomial
that is used to generate the  eld. Different primitive polynomial chosen for the same
 eld can result in different multiplier structure and hence different AND gates being
shared. Due to the sharing of gates, the shared product term forms a critical node of
fault. A transient fault induced on such a critical node thus propagates the erroneous
calculation to multiple outputs thus providing a wrong computational result. Targeting
such critical nodes for deliberate error injection and observations of the functional
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blocks response can give the attacker a clue about the secret information within the
chip.
A B
C
m - bit m - bit
m - bit
m2 - bit
AND Array
XOR Array
C
0
C
m-1
Transient Error
Figure 6.1: Effect of transient fault in a bit-parallel NB multiplier.
For better understanding of the critical nodes and the propagation of the faults in
NB multipliers, a generic NB multiplier example is shown in Fig. 6.1. This diagram
shows the AND array and XOR array that performs the NB multiplication. Due to the
modular reduction operation performed with the primitive polynomial, one or more
AND gates may be shared and these in turn are part of multiple output terms. Thus by
inducing fault in one of such critical shared gate can cause errors in multiple output
bits. The red highlighted path in Fig. 6.1 shows the erroneous critical AND gate and
105
6.2 Effects of Faults on Reliability of Galois Field Circuits
the multiple error caused by inducing an error at that node.
The general NB multiplication can be represented as,
C(x) = a(x) ·b(x) mod P(x) (6.1)
where, a(x) and b(x) are the multiplication inputs over GF(2m) and P(x) is the
primitive polynomial that de nes structure of the Galois  eld under consideration.
The multiplicands a(x) and b(x) are represented in NB as [75],
a(x) =
m−1
∑
i=0
aiα
2i (6.2)
b(x) =
m−1
∑
i=0
biα
2i (6.3)
There has been little research done on faults and fault tolerant designs for QCA.
The technique of [76; 77; 78] reports some of the causes of faults and fault tolerance
in QCA based circuits. The primary cause of faults and errors in QCA seems to be
due to the cell displacements and unwanted inversion during propagation. But to the
best of our knowledge, this is the  rst effort that has been made to analyse the classical
Hamming code based CED schemes in both CNTFET and QCA based designs.
In this chapter, a bit-parallel NB multiplier de ned over binary extended  eld by a
trinomial primitive polynomials of the form P(x) = xm + xk + 1 has been considered.
In general a bit parallel NB multiplier has m2 two input AND gates and (m2 − 1)
two input XOR gates. Due to their ease of implementation, they are widely used in
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) processors which are well known for ensuring high
security with lesser key-lengths. The interesting property of the NB multiplication is
that the squaring operation is very simple in NB as it is just the shift operation [79]. As
the shift operation is almost cost free in hardware, it is highly useful in more complex
inversion circuits.
Fig. 6.2 shows the basic block diagram of the Hamming CED scheme that is used
to detect multiple errors in the test bench NB multiplier circuits. In this design, an
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Figure 6.2: Block diagram of parity based CED
additional parity bit is used in order to increase the Hamming distance to detect up to
3-bit errors.
Due to the limitations of the available present day EDA tools for synthesis of CNT-
FET and QCA circuits, the implementation results have been limited to circuits of
smaller sizes and complexities. However, theoretically, the designs can be extended to
more complex and effective multiple error correcting architectures, e.g. in [10].
6.3 Emerging Technologies
This section explores the two potential technologies that are considered to be the future
replacement for the CMOS technology. The primary candidates seem to be CNTFETs
and QCA. They are predominantly considered over other technologies due to their
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capabilities of maintaining high integration density, lower power consumptions, and
lower chip area requirements.
6.3.1 CNTFETs
The CNTFET based circuits are reported to be high performance alternatives to the ex-
isting CMOS technology in terms of area, power and speed. The  rst CNTFET device
was manufactured in 1998 and has been widely researched to check its adaptability to
replace the CMOS circuits. The CNTFET devices are preferred over CMOS devices
due to many reasons. One of the reasons is that CNTFET imposes only a slight in-
crease in the NRE cost of its fabrication. This is because of the fact that, CNTFETs
are similar to that of MOSFETs in physical structure except the conducting channel
material. In CNTFETs, the bulk silicon channel material of the MOSFET is replaced
by a single carbon nano-tube or by array of tubes. The in depth details of CNTFET
device properties are not discussed in this chapter. The physical properties and fea-
tures of CNTFETs are explained in [80]. The cross section of a CNTFET is as shown
in Fig. 6.3, wherein the channel material is a carbon nano tube having semiconducting
properties.
Figure 6.3: Cross Section of a CNTFET
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The fundamental idea of CNTFET based circuits is to continue with the aggressive
scaling in order to achieve high integration density. Typically the technology nodes for
these devices are expected to be 30nm or less, potentially making the logic circuits us-
ing the CNTFETs far more error prone as compared to their CMOS equivalent. Hence,
this makes the fault mitigating methods inevitable in such nano-scale arithmetic logic
circuits realised with CNTFET.
6.3.2 Quantum Dot Cellular Automata
Quantum Dot Cellular Automata (QCA) is another emerging technology that uses
quantum cells (with cell size less than 20nm) to propagate and process information.
In QCA the interconnection between the QCA logic gates is done by quantum wires
that are again realised using QCA cells as compared to the metallic wires in CNTFET
and CMOS technologies.
In QCA the logic is propagated because of the Coulombic interaction between the
driver QCA cell and its neighbouring cells. The binary logic representation and logic
propagation in QCA is shown in Fig. 6.4. Here the black thick dots represent the
electrons and void circles represent the holes or quantum dots. In Fig. 6.4, the thick
dots on the left diagonal of the quantum cell represents logical 0 (Polarity =−1) and
the thick dots on the right diagonal represents logical 1 (Polarity = 1).
Information flow in a QCA wireLogic 0 Logic 1
Figure 6.4: QCA binary logic and QCA wire.
As shown in the information !ow part of Fig. 6.4, the electrons will try to settle
down as far as possible w.r.t to its neighbouring cell as a result of the electrostatic
repulsion of the same polarity charge carriers. In QCA, the data !ow in a circuit
is controlled by QCA clocking. The QCA clocking generally has 4 stages, namely,
release, relax, switch, and hold respectively. These four stages are shown in Fig. 6.5.
In the release stage, the tunnelling barrier begins to increase. In the relax stage the
109
6.4 Concurrent Error Detection in Emerging Technologies
tunnelling barrier will be high; in the switch stage the barrier starts to reduce and it
will be low in the hold stage so that the logic information will be retained by the QCA
cell in that particular zone.
Clocking zones of a QCA cell
1
2
3
4
Release
Relax
Switch
Hold
Figure 6.5: QCA clocking.
The AND-XOR-OR logic gates using QCA are realised using QCAmajority gates.
The majority gate in principle acts as a voter that gives output as the majority of the
input logic. The majority with one input set to  xed polarity P = 1 acts as an OR
gate and as an AND gate if P = 0. A Majority OR-AND gate in QCA is as shown in
Fig. 6.6.
The XOR gate in QCA can be realised using three QCA AND gates and two in-
verters as shown in Fig. 6.7.
6.4 Concurrent Error Detection in Emerging Technolo-
gies
From the discussion so far, it is evident that critical applications in hardware such as a
crypto-processor are prone to transient error based attacks. Fig. 6.1 depicts a generic
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Majority Gate AND gate
Figure 6.6: QCA Gates.
Figure 6.7: QCA XOR and simple NOT gate.
example to show how error or fault at one critical node may cause multiple bit errors
at the output. Owing to these facts, this chapter investigates the performance of the
error detection schemes in the potential emerging technologies. Since the emerging
technologies are still under research level, there are hardly any EDA tools available
for constructing complex designs. Hence this chapter is limited to investigation over
smaller design examples. However these may be extended to large circuits in the near
future with the availability of more capable CAD tools.
111
6.4 Concurrent Error Detection in Emerging Technologies
6.4.1 Error Source in CNTFET Design
In CNTFET based designs, the main expected source of faulty operation can be sim-
ilar to its CMOS counterpart. They are, stuck-at faults due to minute particle deposi-
tion during manufacturing, stuck-open faults due to the electron migration, or ageing.
There can also be faults that result from the party intrusion using highly energised par-
ticles [77; 78]. Possibilities of such attacks are mainly reported in digital circuits used
in critical applications such as cryptography where an intruder is keen on leaking out
the hidden information such as a secret key.
The fabrication of carbon nano-tubes on silicon surfaces using controlled labora-
tory atmosphere can be dif cult due to the unpredictable behaviour of the resulting
CNT wires. The CNT grown on the silicon surfaces can either be metallic or semicon-
ducting in nature. The metallic CNT can produce a permanent short circuit between
drain and source of the transistor device and hence faulty device feature and high leak-
age current. This behavior of the CNT is the main cause for stuck-at or stuck open
faults. Hence, for CNTFET manufacturing, one prefers semiconducting CNTs, rather
than metallic ones.
6.4.2 Faults in Quantun Cellular Automata Designs
Even though there are designs and logic circuits that have been done using the QCA,
it is not always easy and straightforward to realize all digital circuits in QCA due to
unwanted cross talks and other faults in QCA cells.
As discussed in previous sections, the information carriers in QCA design are wires
that are realised using QCA cells themselves. It is observed in prior research that the
polarization of a QCA cell not only depends on just its adjacent cells but also on its
surrounding cells. This often gives rise to unwanted data manipulation while propaga-
tion especially in wire cross overs in complex designs. The other sources of faults can
be be due to the QCA cell displacement while manufacturing. A slight movement to a
cell from its intended position can give rise to incorrect data. These fault sources are
in addition to the error sources those are discussed in case of CNTFETs. The highly
energetic radiation can also introduce transient errors in quantum dot designs [81].
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Due to the minute device size in QCA, the circuit structures realised using QCA
technology may be easily vulnerable to radiation and other energized particle strikes.
The trend of reliability versus device miniaturisation shows an inverse dependability.
These investigations hence prove that fault tolerant techniques are inevitable in cur-
rent and emerging technologies. The following section explores the simple Hamming
code based CED technique and its implementation in emerging technologies.
6.4.3 CED using Predicted Parity
The Hamming codes are well known and easy to implement error detecting codes gen-
erally known as single error correcting and double error detecting codes (SEC/DED).
However, Hamming codes can also detect an extra bit error if the Hamming distance
is increased by adding an extra parity bit to the code. In this chapter 4-bit error de-
tecting Hamming codes are considered. In practice, to detect multiple bit errors, check
bits (parity) are generated from the primary input to compute the checksum for the
functional block (NB multiplier) as shown in Fig. 5.1.
The 4 bit Hamming parity for a 4-bit multiplier circuit is calculated in the follow-
ing:
P1 = C0⊕C2⊕C3 (6.4)
P2 = C0⊕C1⊕C3⊕C4 (6.5)
P3 = C0⊕C1⊕C4 (6.6)
P4 = C0⊕C1⊕C2⊕C4 (6.7)
The generated parities and the multiplier functional block outputs are then passed
on to the decoder to generate syndromes that detect the occurrence of an error. This
scheme can however be easily scaled to a single error correctable scheme by adding
the Hamming decoding part.
6.5 Experimental Results
This section presents the experimental results of the performance of CED in emerging
technologies as compared to their CMOS equivalent. For fair comparison, the CED
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schemes are implemented over NB multipliers of various sizes namely 1, 2, 3 and 4-bit
multipliers. The circuits are modeled at gate level using 45nm CNTFET library from
Stanford University and simulated for power and delay using the HSPICE simulator.
For comparison, the equivalent CMOS version has been implemented.
The QCA based circuits are designed using QCADesigner tool from the Walus
group of British Columbia University. However the tool is still under development and
only functional simulation is possible with the current version of the tool. A 2-bit NB
multiplier has been designed using the QCADesigner tool and CED scheme has been
embedded with it as shown in Fig. 6.10 and Fig. 6.12 respectively.
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Figure 6.8: Average power dissipation comparison of NB multipliers in CMOS and
CNTFET with or without CED.
The power dissipation comparison of the multiplier with and without CED of the
NB GF multiplier is shown in Fig. 6.8. The  gure shows the power dissipation pro le
of CMOS circuits with CNTFET equivalent. It clearly shows that the CNTFET based
technology is signi cantly superior to the CMOS based implementation with lower
power requirements.
Fig. 6.9 shows the variation of complexity of the parity prediction block as the
multiplier size increases. The trend shows a considerable increase in the parity bits
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required as the multiplier size increases. This diagram shows the number of parity bits
required for each multiplier size for a 3-bit error detection.
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Figure 6.9: Parity prediction block complexity w.r.t multiplier size.
For analysis, a QCA version of the 2-bit NB GF multiplier has been designed as
shown in Fig. 6.10. The implementation is achieved using AND-XOR logic based on
the QCA majority gates. The inverters used in the layout are the simple inverter logic
as shown in Fig. 6.7.
Fig. 6.12 shows the extended error detectable version of the Fig. 6.10. The var-
ious colors in the layout represent the various clocking zones of the QCA. Fig. 6.11
shows the functional simulation result for the 2-bit NB multiplier for one of the 4 input
combination.
Table 6.1: Delay information of various NB multipliers.
No. of bits CNTFET (sec) CMOS (sec)
2 1.33∗10−11 5.5∗10−10
3 1.4∗10−11 5.6∗10−10
4 1.4∗10−11 6.7∗10−10
5 1.41∗10−11 7∗10−10
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Figure 6.10: 2-bit NB multiplier using QCA.
Figure 6.11: Example Simulation of a NB QCA Multiplier.
Table 6.2: Delay information of NB multipliers with CED.
No. of bits CNTFET (sec) CMOS (sec)
2 3.2∗10−11 1.7∗10−9
3 3.65∗10−11 1.81∗10−9
4 4.15∗10−11 2.33∗10−9
5 5.1∗10−11 2.73∗10−9
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Figure 6.12: 2-bit NB multiplier with CED using QCA.
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6.6 Summary
The critical path delay comparison of the NB multipliers implemented in both
CMOS and CNTFETs are presented in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2. In general the hard-
ware complexity remains the same for any bit parallel GF multiplier circuit as they
have m2 AND gates and (m2−1) XOR gates in general.
6.6 Summary
Owing to the substantial scaling of devices, it is evident that the future technologies
under the 20nm technology may be more vulnerable to transient faults than it is to-
day. VLSI circuits for critical applications such as crypto hardware realised over the
emerging miniature devices in CNTFETs and QCA cells hence need to be made fault
tolerant. Hence this chapter investigates the performance of well known concurrent
error detection approach in both CNTFET and WCA based NB GF circuits. To this
end the chapter explored error detection with CED in NB GF multipliers. The mul-
tiplier circuits were chosen for the experiments as they can be the vital and critical
components for malicious attacks. As a start up phase, simple NB multiplier structures
were designed over 45nm CMOS and CNTFET technologies for a fair comparison.
Their power and delay are compared for the understanding of the performance of CED
scheme in the emerging technologies. The scheme has also been implemented over
the QCA technology to evaluate the logic performance. Due to the limitations of the
available present day EDA tools for synthesis of CNTFET and QCA circuits, the im-
plementations over CNTFET and QCA have been limited to circuits of smaller sizes
and complexities. In addition, only the error detection capabilities were implemented
owing to these limitations. However from the investigation presented in this chapter,
it is very much clear that the minute emerging technologies will be prone to faults
and thus errors. Hence fault tolerant techniques will be inevitable to improve their
yield. There by this chapter provides a starting point to investigated the state of the
art fault tolerant methods in the emerging technology devices. Our future work in-
clude extension of the reported circuits into more complex circuits and  nally towards
a fault tolerant crypto processor. This also includes investigation of other fault tolerant
technologies such as LDPC, multiple error correcting schemes such as BCH codes,
etc.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Conclusions
The increase in demand for secure communication in various applications leaves the
secure computing devices such as crypto-hardware as a subject of malicious attacks.
Along with well known naturally occurring faults, such attacks with the help of ma-
liciously inject faults, may severely interrupt the normal operations of these devices.
Hence the focus of this thesis is to investigate novel multiple error correcting schemes
in  nite  eld arithmetic circuits as a mitigation technique from such events. As the
 nite  eld multipliers constitute the complex and important building blocks in the
crypto-arithmetic hardware circuits, making these multipliers fault tolerant will even-
tually increase the reliability of the crypto-hardware circuits. Hence this thesis mainly
focuses on the multiple error correction architectures together with  nite  eld multi-
plier circuits as test bench circuits.
For completeness, a through literature survey of the underlying weaknesses of the
 nite  eld arithmetic structures, various attacks on these circuits and other sources of
faults that affects their normal operation, has been carried out in Chapter 2. However
the primary contribution of this thesis is to mitigate those faults or attacks that can
be used to manipulate the internals of the circuits in an attempt to gain access to the
sensitive information within a digital system. In Chapter 3, a literature survey has been
undertaken to understand previous research to address naturally occurring faults and
malicious transient attacks on the logic circuits. The most important researches that are
related to this thesis such as CED and single error correction schemes are investigated.
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A baseline research based on block wise multiple bit error correction using RS codes
has also been reported. This acts as a stepping stone towards the other novel multiple
error correction techniques proposed in this thesis. Based on these observations, novel
techniques have been proposed in this thesis to ef ciently mitigate the in!uence and
the effect of a fault or to make such attacks harder.
A novel multiple error correcting scheme based on the BCH codes is proposed
in Chapter 4. This proposed technique is scalable and optimized for multiple error
correction in  nite  eld arithmetic circuits and other compliant digital logic circuits in
general. A highly parallel and optimized circuit has been proposed to save area while
ensuring improved performance. The proposed architecture is useful in applications
where high security is the prime concern. The proposed scheme is also scalable to
increase the number of errors that it can cope with by making them easy to integrate
with any circuit size. Later in this chapter an extended dynamically error correctable
version is presented to compensate the extra delay of the decoder when the actual
functional unit is error free. This extension includes a dynamic activation of the error
correction block only when the error is present and thus saving delay penalty. The
proposed technique proved to be capable of correcting multiple random errors with
less area overhead than that of TMR and comparable overhead as that of single error
correcting schemes.
The multiple error correction scheme has been taken to the next level with the help
of a novel cross parity based low complexity, low area overhead technique in Chap-
ter 5. The main idea of the cross parity based technique is to ensure high reliability
while ensuring the area overhead as minimum as possible. However like any error
correction schemes, this approach makes a compromise between the number of errors
corrected and the additional area, delay and power overhead compared to the actual
design. The reliability and the number of bit error correction capability is evaluated
both theoretically and experimentally using cutting edge EDA tools. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the  rst reported scheme that has implemented multiple bit er-
ror correction in practically used 163-bit digit serial  nite  eld multipliers. The area,
power and delay performance of the proposed cross parity scheme proved to be im-
pressive and better than the existing error mitigation schemes by a large factor. Also,
the fault simulation performed on the test designs of cross parity scheme proves that it
has wider range of error correction capability as compared to the existing SEC/DED,
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LDPC schemes. This scheme also has comparable area overhead to that of single error
correction schemes, which was shown to be approximately 120% for a 80-bit parallel
multiplier and 180% for a 163-bit digit serial multiplier. The multiple bit error correc-
tion architecture proposed in this chapter  nd useful applications in areas where low
area overhead and power consumption is required along with increased fault tolerance.
This includes applications such as RFIDs, smart cards, and sensor networks.
Increasing demand for higher levels of performance and miniaturization of CMOS
devices has made researchers think about replacement technologies such as CNTFETs
and QCA based circuits. Their extreme shrinkage in sizes these devices have made
them perfect candidates for faults and errors. Chapter 6 investigated the feasibility of
 nite  eld circuits and a classic CED scheme based on Hamming codes in such emerg-
ing technologies. The detailed experimental results and comparisons with CMOS tech-
nology are presented in this chapter. The experimental results indicated that the emerg-
ing technologies perform better in terms of reduced area overhead, power and delay
while maintaining error detection capabilities with the proposed techniques. However
due to their feature sizes spanning from 20nm CNTFETs down to 2nm QCA dots, en-
suring their fault free (fault resilient) operations under erroneous circumstances may
be a requirement. Hence this investigation could be a stepping stone towards achieving
this goal.
7.2 Future Work
For simplicity of experimental validation, the proposed schemes are implemented in
integration with only functional units such as  nite  eld multipliers. The fundamen-
tal building blocks of a stand alone crypto-processor include adders, inversion circuits
along with multipliers. Hence to achieve a fault tolerant processor, fault mitigation
techniques must be incorporated with all other design blocks of the processor. How-
ever, a straight forward implementation of the techniques proposed in this chapter to
a whole processor may induce a high area overhead. Hence other techniques such
as sharing the fault tolerant blocks among various arithmetic units within a proces-
sor needs to be considered. Future research may include extension of the proposed
techniques to achieve fault tolerance in an entire processor.
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Another important extension of the proposed techniques is to incorporate them in
the design !ow of the available commercial EDA tools. At present, the ASIC de-
velopment tools do not have the capacity to include the error correction features by
designers choice into the actual design automatically. On the other hand the FPGA
development tools support the inclusion of fault tolerant IP blocks such as TMR in to
the actual design to make them fault tolerant. This can be investigated to help the inte-
gration of the proposed techniques to the standard EDA tool !ow to reduce the design
complexity.
The multiple error correction techniques proposed in this thesis are mainly based
on space redundant scheme. Though the area overhead has been optimized to reduce
the underlying power and delay, it is impossible to completely neglect the contribution
of the additional error correction block that is being added to the actual design. How-
ever techniques such as operand isolation and power gating along with the proposed
techniques can be investigated to reduce dynamic and static power consumption hence
improving the over all cost of the resulting fault tolerant designs.
Also, due to the limitations of the available present day EDA tools for synthesis of
CNTFET and QCA circuits, the implementations over CNTFET and QCA have been
limited to circuits of smaller sizes and complexities. Further research is also required
in the development of device modeling and the EDA tools themselves. Once those are
achieved, much more complex circuits can be investigated based on the fault tolerant
schemes presented in this thesis. Due to the differences in properties of the devices, it
is also possible that the emerging technologies can face many more challenging error
sources than considered in the existing literature. Future research in this area also
includes investigation of other fault sources and their mitigation other than the ones
reported in this thesis.
Last not but least, the test bench circuits considered in this thesis are all de ned
over the  nite  elds. However the proposed methods can be easily extended to other
circuits whose output can be predicted in advance from the primary inputs. Compati-
bility of the proposed techniques for developing a generic fault tolerant IP for multiple
application areas such as other generic digital circuits can be investigated as a future
extension to this proposed research.
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